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INTRODUCTION
The Eurocommunist phenomena in Western Europe has gained
great notoriety since 1976. In that year, a conference of the Euro-
pean communist party organizations was held in East Berlin. The
meeting ended in dissension and discord. The cause of this dis-
content was inter-party wrangling over the desire for ideological in-
dependence from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Several
national party delegations pushed for greater freedom in their inter-
pretations of Marxist-Leninist thought.
The core of the insurgent group consisted of the Spanish
(P.C.E.), French (P.C.F.), and Italian (P.C.I.) Commiinist parties from
Western Europe and the Yugoslavian and Rumanian parties from Eastern
Europe. Behind the Western bloc's insubordination was the desire to
find an accommodation between Marxist-Leninist dogma and political
success in advanced industrial nations with functional electoral sys-
tems. The Spanish, French, and the Italian parties have formed the
center of what has been termed the Eurocommunist movement. The P.C.I.
and the P.C.F. have attempted electoral or parliamentary coalitions
with some success while the Spanish Communists have presented them-
selves as a leading ideological and moral force in the movement.
Although the particularities of the Spanish situation differ
from those in France or Italy, the goal of forging a coalition of
progressive forces is a very common trait. The need to project a safe
1
2yet progressive image and the weakness of the left vis-a-vis the
center and the right have made coalition politics a pragmatic alter-
native
.
thesis argues that the P.C.E. has played a vital role in
the recent developments of Eurocommunism. It will also demonstrate
that the fashioning of Eurocommunism has been an evolutionarly process
that began before the Second World War and has continued until today.
The importance of the P.C.E. itself, in constituting a Eurocommunist
theme, has gradually increased over this period. The many influences
which contributed to ideological and political changes in the present
day Eurocommunist parties can be observed in the history of those
parties and in other important events. Within the Spanish party, an
extremely fundamental influence upon the development of Eurocommunism
has been the personality of its Secretary - General
,
Santiago Carrillo.
The rise of the Spanish party to its positions as an acknowledged center
of the Eurocommunist philosophy is closely tied with Carrillo's career
as the party's leader.
A developmental overview of Eurocommunism will explore those
events which influenced the loss of loyalty to the Soviet Union by the
Western European parties. Not all of the actions that undermined the
authority of the C.P.S.U. took place within Western Europe. Yet each
incremental loss of international discipline contributed to the centri-
fugal forces out of which Eurocommunism was spawned.
An exposition of the general themes of Eurocommunism will fol-
low this overview. It will portray the salient points of the common
3Euroconununist understandings. The general strategies and political
desires of the Eurocommunist parties will be addressed in this
section
.
A brief history of the Spanish Communist party will be pre-
sented in order to trace the development of its Eurocommunist positions
and to understand the particular influences which have helped to shape
the Spanish variant of Eurocommunism. The experiences of the Spanish
organization have been the base upon which Santiago Carrillo has built
a new, revised theory of Marxist revolution. In doing so, he has bro-
ken the historical ties which had bound the Spanish Communists to the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This relationship had been of
particular importance in the party's early days, but it changed as new
developments surfaced both within Spain and the world movement.
The last part of this work covers the career of Carrillo and
his most important publications concerning Eurocommunism. In Problems
of Socialism Today
,
Dialogues on Spain
,
and Eurocommunism and the
State
,
Mr. Carrillo has evolved a general theme of Spanish Eurocommu-
nism which also has implications for the Eurocommunists throughout the
rest of Europe. Santiago Carrillo has become a major spokesman for
a strategy which stresses achievement in electoral politics. He pro-
poses a "type of socialism with universal suffrage," It is clear that
the Italian Commianist Party leader Togliatti and the Italian "new road
to socialism" were an influence on Carrillo and other Eurocommunists.
In recent years however, the P.C.E. and its leader have been at times
the most vocal and ideologically deviant of the Eurocommunists.
4This study has utilized printed material concerning a number of
issues within the Communist world. Attention has been paid to not only
the Eurocommunist parties but to texts dealing with East European,
Soviet, and Chinese Communism as well. Personal observations in Europe
in January and February of 1979 were helpful in organizing the paper and
in understanding some of the more subtle aspects of the subject. In
considering the views of Mr. Carrillo, extensive use of direct quota-
tions was made in order to present as accurate a picture as possible of
his theories in a paper of this type. Articles by and about Eurocommu-
nists as well as other relevant communist subjects have been an impor-
tant source in compiling this study. All printed sources appear in the
bibliography at the end of the work and footnotes will be found at the
end of the appropriate chapters.
The P.C.E. Today
It is ironic that the P.C.E. should push so vehemently for a
theme of evolutionary socialism. It had once been the most faithful of
servants to the C.P.S.U. In addition, the decision to promote the
electoral process as an avenue of social revolutionary change comes
from a party which had been outlawed for close to forty years in its
own country- The particular conditions in Spain have influenced the
development of the revisionist line. Legalization of the P.C.E. has
placed it in a position to compete for power in the same manner as the
Italian and French Communist Parties. Given its past conditions of
existence, stunning electoral victories will probably not be likely in
5the inimediate future. Coalition building and moderate electoral gains
seem to be in store for the party before it becomes as domestically
important as are the P.C.F. and P.C.I. in their respective countries.
However, legalization may not have even taken place without the estab-
lishment of the revisionist line. Although the larger French and Ital-
ian parties have at times received more publicity because of their im-
mediate electoral potential, the party in Spain has been fundamental to
the development of Eurocommunism and the schism between the West Euro-
pean Communists and the C.P.S.U.
CHAPTER I
THE DEVELOPMENT AND THEMES OF EUROCOMMUNISM
The emergence of the Eurocommunist phenomena can be traced as
early as the "popular front" era of the international Communist move-
ment. These popular front activities were usually undertaken in order
to benefit the C.P.S.U. and the designs of the Soviet Union's foreign
policy. Tito's post-war challenges to the political and ideological
centralism of the U.S.S.R. and the C.P.S.U. were a precursor to the
West European disaffection. When Mao Tse Tung succeeded in bringing
the Chinese Communist Party to power despite Stalin's skepticism, the
authority of the Soviet Communist party in world affairs was further
undermined. At the time of the 20th Party Congress of the C.P.S.U.,
Kruschev was ready to denounce Stalin and blame him for the excesses of
the past. The Italian Communist leader, Palmiro Togliatti, claimed it
was not Stalin in particular, but the structure of the Soviet system
in general that was to blame. This claim further damaged the credi-
bility of the Soviet Union's ideological leadership.
By 1960, the solidarity of the international movement was
ruptured when a rift developed between the People's Republic of China
and the Soviet Union. Moscow was no longer the only major center of
world communism. The Soviet response was to prevail upon the other
Communist parties to ostracize the Chinese. Although some parties
were willing to condemn the C.C.P., formal censure of the organization
6
7was regarded as not being in the interest of the international movement
by many members. Furthermore, it appeared that a Soviet chauvinism was
tainting the international character of the movement. The 1968 inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia that was sponsored by the U.S.S.R. demonstrated
to many national parties how brutal Soviet repression of delinquent
parties might be.
At this juncture, the themes that are basic to Eurocommunism
began to take root. The West European parties were dismayed by the
Soviet actions, and the Spanish party was particularly annoyed. From
this time onward, the Italian, Spanish, and French all began to
development autonomous lines of national political power. These
developments took place at different speeds and in different con-
texts. They did share the common foundation of their autonomy from
the interference of the C.P.S.U. By 1976 the three parties were will-
ing to present a united front to Moscow to protect their independence
and the need for electoral competition by the party organizations.
Since that time they have continued to explore avenues of co-operation
and joint action.
The Popular Fronts
Each of the Eurocommunist parties shares the legacy of creating
political coalitions and participating in anti-facist military alli-
ances. The Spanish Party came to be the predominant anti-Franco force
in the Spanish Civil War. The French Communists were members of
the electoral coalitions such as the United Front and the Popular Front
8during the 1930s. They were also involved in organizing resistance to
the Nazi occupation of France. The Italian party was driven under-
ground in 1926, but it was actively involved in anti-fascist propaganda
and resistance until its participation in the immediate post-war Ital-
ian government.
These anti-fascist struggles and political coalitions were not
simply cases of national parties following their own predilections. To
be sure, nationalism and patriotic intent often played an important role
in determining the actions of the parties and their members. Another
extremely important factor which contributed to the actions of these
P^J^ties was the relationship each had with the U.S.S.R. and the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union. Each of the parties was closely tied
to the C.P.S.U. through the organization of the Communist International.
This organization was sponsored by the Soviet Union in order to culti-
vate Bolshevik-style socialist parties in different countries. The
Soviet Union used its position as the only revolutionary socialist
state in existence to influence and direct the parties affiliated with-
in the Communist International (Comintern)
.
In the twenties, increasing domestic political intrigue and
several reversals of Soviet foreign policy initiatives prodded the
leadership to adopt a cautious policy vis-a-vis the revolutionairy move-
ments in other areas. The Soviet party leadership became less con-
cerned with promoting revolutions outside the U.S.S.R. and more in-
terested in the notion of building "socialism in one country." As a
result, the Comintern's organization was utilized as an instrument of
9Soviet foreign policy. The intention was to have the affiliated
parties take actions in order to protect the U.S.S.R. In doing so,
the parties would facilitate the consolidation of socialism in that
country. Once this had been accomplished, then other revolutions could
proceed with the Soviet Union as their base. In September 1928 this
program was described:
The U.S.S.R. is the base of the world movement of all
oppressed classes, the center of international revolution, the
greatest factor in world history . . . she is the inter-
national driving force of the proletarian revolution that im-
plies the proletariat of all countries to seize power. . . .
In view of the fact that the U.S.S.R. is the only fatherland
of the international proletariat, the principal bulwark of
achievements and the most important factor for its inter-
national emancipation, the international proletariat must on
its part facilitate, the success of the work of socialist con-
struction in the U.S.S.R. and defend her against attacks of the
capitalist powers by all the means in its power. . . . This
international discipline must find expression in the subordi-
nation of the partial and local interests and in strict ful-
fillment by all members of the decisions passed by the leading
bodies of the Coounist International.^
This statement set the tone for future relationships between
the Comintern and its affiliated members. Prior to 1928 the party
organizations had depended on the Comintern and the C.P.S.U. for
leadership and support. The terms of realtions among the parties were
founded in the Leninist ideal of "democratic centralism. " When the
Soviet leadership had been a collective effort, foreign communists
could hold divergent views under the patronage of various members of
the Soviet oligarchy. Once Joseph Stalin had successfully outmaneu-
vered the Trotskite wing of the C.P.S.U., this association changed.
The demise of Trotsky and later Zinoviev and Bukharin foreshadowed the
end of diversity. The fading of these internationally respected men
10
meant that to be a communist, one must necessarily be a Stalinist.^
Differences in Marxist-I^ninist thought became subject to the interpre-
tations of Stalin since no one but he was capable of enforcing them.
The result of this situation was the centralization of the
international movement and the duplication of the Stalinist model of
organizational structure in the national communist parties. Within
each party a hierarchy of leadership loyal to Stalin was expected to
follow the directions of the Stalinist dominated Comintern.
At first, the Stalinist leadership's scorn for "bourgeois
democracy" and Social Democrats made the West European governments and
socialist parties the objects of contempt. Coalitions of the left were
rejected vehemently immediately following Stalin's victory over his
3
rxvals for leadership within the C.P.S.U. As the Soviet chief com-
posed his appraisal of Fascism's development, a shift in strategies
began to take place. The fascist associations had formerly been con-
sidered useful in catalyzing working-class solidarity with the national
communist parties. It was believed their effect would be to undercut
the attraction of other leftist groups such as the Socialists, Anarch-
ists, Trotskites, and Anarcho-Syndicalists. By 1935 the Soviets had
become apprehensive that fascist movements were becoming more of a
threat to the Soviet Union than either western capitalism or social
democracy. Throughout Europe governments were being discredited by
fascist parties which played on popular discontent at the expense of
the communists. llieir appeals, based on nationalist principles, ran
contrary to the tenets of "proletarian internationalism" that were
11
upheld by the Comintern affiliates. while parties such as the French
Communists were maintaining a militantly anti-nationalist posture, the
reactionary groups were gaining momentum by touting nationalist
ideology and militarism. It became apparent that the destruction of
the center and center-left political parties’ credibility was spurring
this growth of anti-Soviet forces and isolating the national communist
parties
.
The ensuing shift in Soviet strategy produced an attempt to
co-operate with center and leftist political parties. It was clearly
intended to neutralize or retard fascist development. A 1935 report
to the Seventh Congress of the Communist International stated in part:
The first thing that is to be done is to form a United
Front, to establish unity of action of the workers in every
factory . . . The Communist International attaches no conditions
to unity of action except one, an elementary condition ac-
ceptable to all workers, viz. That the unity of action be
directed against the offense of capital, against the threat of
war ... we defend and still continue to defend every inch of
bourgeois Democratic liberties which are being attacked by
fascism and bourgeois reaction because the interests of class
struggle of the proletariat so dictate.^
While this change in strategy produced co-operation among the
anti-fascist forces within each country, it underscores the influence
that the Comintern exerted over its affiliates. Parties' policies for
national participation were determined not in those countries but in
Moscow and the intention of the popular fronts was to serve the strate-
gic interests of the Soviet Union. The programs were not formulated
with the notion of utilizing nationalist sentiment for the indigenous
parties' own success. It was not expected that the participation in
12
broad coalitions would become a permanent method for dealing with the
pressure from reactionary and conservative forces.
The arrangements made between the communists and their coalition
partners were expected to yield strategic benefits for the U.S.S.R. and
not the political success of the European organizations. The purposes
of the coalitions were designed solely with a monocentric character. As
an example, when the Soviets became involved in the Spanish Civil War,
they perceived the Spanish Anarchists as an ideological threat. The
Spanish Communist Party was in a position of great political leverage
and strength because it was the Soviets ' channel for the aid which kept
the Spanish Republic from toppling. The Soviets urged the P.C.E. to
promote the isolation and repression of the Anarchists because the
Stalinists were concerned that a revolutionary success by the Anarchists
might establish a far-leftist regime with the potential for political
heresy .
^
It was evident that the Stalinist-dominated C.P.S.U. and
Comintern would not tolerate dissent over ideological or political
strategies. The master-servant relationship that had developed as a
result of Stalinist centralism clearly defined the limits of the
national parties' independence from the Soviet Union. The Leninist
legacy had generated a dislike for social democracy within the Comin-
tern, yet the disdain for other parties of the left or center did not
prohibit co-operation in times of dire necessity. It did rule out long
term partnerships for the purpose of socialist transition. National
communist parties were expected to refrain from collaborative tendencies
13
and maintain the discipline of the international order. The Soviet
Union was to be considered the focal point for ideological, political,
and moral leadership and Soviet socialism was to be a model for other
socialist systems.
If nationalist tendencies were operative in this scheme, they
were Soviet in nature. The client parties were cut-off from an
important source of mobilization when they were forced to dogmatically
consider "proletarian internationalism" as the only appropriate world
view. While other groups made gains by professing a concern for
national issues, many communist parties acted unswervingly to protect
the interests of the Soviet Union. This characteristic was later
nullified in part by the parties active in resistance movements during
the Second World War. The identification of the communist parties with
patriotic anti-fascist activity bolstered their support in several
nations. Although the Soviets disbanded the Comintern in 1943, Stalin
still believed that internationalist discipline had been and could
continue to be maintained. Events would prove otherwise.
Still another effect was the development of broad based
coalitions in counter-acting reaction from extreme conservative ele-
ments. Although the fronts were not successful in halting the advance
of fascism internally, they did serve to illustrate the alternatives to
isolation and simple opposition that had been the norm of the parties in
the thirties. After the war, this lesson would become a part of the
developing strategies and policies of some European parties.
14
Titoism
Joseph (Broz) Tito was made Secretary-General of the Yugoslav
Communist Party in 1937. All the previous Yugoslav Secretaries-General
had perished in the Soviet purges of the 1930s. A member of the Yugo-
slav organization since 1921, Tito returned to rebuild the party after
several years in exile.
From 1939 until 1941 the party remained subservient to Moscow's
direction. As a result, the communists played very little part in
anti-fascist activities until the Soviet-German non-aggression pact
was voided on June 22, 1941. After this time, the Yugoslav party
became a main source of military resistance and an organizing agent
for anti-fascist partisanship- Although it was faced with a rival
partisan group, the communist partisan activity became increasingly en-
twined with Yugoslav nationalism. The eventual dominance of the com-
munist partisans in post-war Yugoslavia was the nationalistic mobili-
6
zation of the population on a supra-ethnic basis.
When the Second World War ended, the Soviet Union moved to
consolidate its strategic gains in Eastern Europe. In order to avoid
endangering its sphere of influence, the U.S.S.R. tried to avoid pro-
voking its western allies in their own perceived spheres. This re-
sulted in both the Italian and French parties being instructed to be
co-operative in establishing new national governments.
In Eastern Europe the Soviets sponsored the establishment of
"Peoples Democracies." Yugoslavia also established a socialist regime
15
with Soviet participation. The Yugoslavs did not consider themselves
to be particularly indebted to Soviet assistance for their liberation.
It soon became apparent that Yugoslav national interest would become a
direct influence on the relationship between the C.P.S.U. and the
national party. Tito was not hesitant about challenging the western
allies over such issues as the occupation of the Trieste region or
about proposing a Balkan federation to the Soviets.
A Communist Information Bureau was established in 1947 so
that the new socialist states and the non—governing communist parties
could be organized into an international forum for the conveyance
of C.P.S.U. doctrinal and political leadership. The Yugoslav party
boldly assured the delegates to the first meeting that it was respons-
ible for Yugoslavia's liberation and this position embarrassed the
Soviet Union. The slight seems to have been forgiven when the Yugo-
slavs bitterly criticized the French and Italian parties for their
collaboration in their countries' post-war governments. Yugoslavia's
action seemed to confirm its reliance upon the Soviet Union for di-
rection, yet within one year the situation changed.
The Soviet veto of a proposed Balkan federation was the im-
mediate cause of the change in the Yugoslav- Soviet understanding.
The disagreement over Tito's diplomatic aspirations was actually the
culmination of growing resentment over Soviet infiltration of the
Yugoslav regime. The Yugoslav Communists rooted out C.P.S.U. sym-
pathizers and agents and neutralized them. This represented a threat
to Stalin's authority and control over the international movement.
16
When the Soviet Central Committee attempted to bully its Yugoslav
counterpart in March 1948, its action proved counterproductive. Tito
and his clique were in complete control of the Yugoslav party apparatus
and no attempt to foment an insurrection from within was successful.
The Soviet Union then chose to condemn Tito and brand him a heretic.
The ensuing external pressure caused the Yugoslavs to become
steadfast in their defiance of Moscow. "Proletarian internationalism"
became an issue. A new Yugoslav ideology held that since the Soviet
Union was no longer the only socialist state, the old rules of un-
swerving loyalty to Moscow were no longer valid. The new conditions
dictated absolute equality between communist parties and reciprocal
non-interference. The Soviet Union was pronounced guilty of promoting
and practicing "hegemonism while the structure of the Soviet state
8
was criticized as state-capitalist-despotism.
This critical view contributed to disunity within the inter-
national movement. A key element in the Titoist break seems to have
been the reconciliation of communism with nationalism. Tito was able
to break through the ideological stranglehold of the C.P.S.U. and the
Cominform. Previously, this control had been fairly effective at
directing the policies and actions of the national communist parties.
Aside from the Yugoslavs, only the Chinese Communist Party had been
successful in pursuing an independent, nationally oriented path. The
Yugoslav revision had serious political and ideological implications.
Although the intention of the Yugoslav leadership may not have been
aimed at developing an alternative ideology, the existence of an
17
independent, nationalist Yugoslav party in control of a recognized
socialist state seriously damaged the monocentric facade that Moscow
ghad projected since 1928.
The basis for ideological heresy had been established, but
discipline did not totally dissolve. The international socialist
brotherhood, still mainly Stalinist in composition, held fast behind
the Soviet Union. In Western Europe, a few individuals did defect from
the rigid Stalinist ideology. Groups of French and Italian communists
were interested in exploring the potential for political coalitions and
there were some schismatic deviations from the Soviet influences Some
members of the Italian Party formed Unione Socialista Independinte and
disaffected members of the Spanish Party joined together in Accion
Socialista . Members of the national parties who were expelled during
a series of purges either joined these reformist groups, left the party,
or just diappeared. In East European countries the purges were often
more violent and vicious. The official Soviet response to the heresy
of Tito was to rid the movement of dissent in order to maintain ideo-
logical conformity and discipline.
Mao's Challenge in 1949
Another important and contemporary challenge to the monocentric
attitude of the Soviets was the sinification of Marxism by Mao Tse Tung.
Mao assumed command of the Chinese Communist Party in 1935. The
history of the Chinese Party prior to Mao had been one of pronounced
jLntra—party squabbles and botched Soviet attempts to direct the Chinese
18
revolution. After Mao became the chief of the Chinese Communist Party
(C.C.P.)
,
a definite, nationalist ideology began to develop. This
nationalist character included the belief in the revolutionary poten-
tial of the peasantry and a willingness to reach an accomodation with
the middle-classes.^^
The growth of the Chinese revolution presented the C.P.S.U.
leadership with an uncomfortable situation. The existence of friction
between the Stalinist clique leading the C.P.S.U. and the Maoist led
C.C.P. predates the Sino-Soviet split of the early nineteen sixties.
During the thirties and forties each party had occasion to criticize the
other for dogmatic excesses and tactical errors. Since the Maoist
line was strongly nationalist in content, such an approach necessarily
conflicted with the "internationalist" character of the Soviet model.
Because the Chinese had decided that Stalinist strategic objectives
were not always beneficial to the C.C.P. aims, controversy seemed in-
evitable in the Sino-Soviet relationship. The C.P.S.U. leadership
could not reconcile itself with the fact that an independent Chinese
Communist Party could act outside the parameters of Soviet desires.
In 1945 the Soviet leadership advised Mao and his compatriots
to reach an accomodation with the Kuomintang forces of Chang Kai Shek.
This policy was proposed for the benefit of Soviet strategic con-
12
siderations. Although the C.C.P. agreed with the Soviets on a formal
inter-party basis, it continued to pursue its own revolutionary poli-
cies with the intention of completely defeating the KMT. This disre-
gard for C.P.S.U. advice and international discipline was not viewed
19
favorably in Moscow.
Mao's eventual victory in 1949 underscored the fallibility of
the Soviet leadership's interpretation of the international communist
movement. The Chinese victory did not prevent the C.P.S.U. from wel-
coming the People's Republic of China into the fold of socialist states,
but it did make the top party leaders apprehensive about the future.
Besides having flaunted the authority of the C.P.S.U. and the Comin-
form, the C.C.P. success elevated the theories of Mao Tse Tung. This
led to a developing competition in revolutionary ideology which
further damaged the Soviet monopoly on determining the correct and
prudent course for the attainment of socialism. Stalin had been skep-
tical about the chances for the Chinese Communist success. The C.C.P.
victory in the face of this skepticism served as another subtle lesson
to both the Chinese and others. While the specific conditions of
Maoism might not be applicable to West Europeans, the concept of a
nationalist communism was once again demonstrated to be a valid,
pragmatic and successful approach. This served to further undermine
Moscow's credibility and control in the international movement.
De-Stalinization
Stalin's death in 1953 further weakened the monocentric char-
acter of the international movement. With the advent of the Twentieth
Party Congress of the C.P.S.U., important changes took place that
affected the relationship between Moscow and the affiliated parties.
Nikita Kruschev's criticism of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress is
20
commonly recognized as the introduction of "De-Stalinization" to the
t>i^oad reaches of the international movement. The campaign to undercut
the Stalinist traditions and influences opened the way for more ideo-
logical non-conformism.
A major feature of the De-Stalinization campaign was a declara-
tion that "Peaceful Co-existence" was now possible between socialist
states and capitalist states. This policy was intended to lessen the
tensions between the Soviet Union and the western powers in order to
help avoid a nuclear confrontation. The policy became an important
point of dissatisfaction among some members of the socialist cummunity.
Disagreement over the validity of this interpretation within the para-
meters of Marxist-Leninist ideology upset both Europeans and Chinese.
A second extremely important condition of the De-Stalinization
campaign was establishment of a theory of "different roads to social-
ism." Since the 1948 break with Yugoslavia, this notion had been con-
sidered a dangerous challenge to international discipline. During the
Twentieth Party Congress, the C.P.S.U. leaders now recognized there
might be a certain particularity of revolutionary conditions among
different nations. Kruschev also spoke about the possibility of
achieving socialism by a parliamentary path. He indicated that the
transition to socialism was not necessarily preceded by armed conflict.
It was explained that this parliamentary path had not been available to
the Russian Bolsheviks, but new developments made it possible for dif-
ferent revolutionary methods to now be employed. This view was sup-
ported by citing the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. The decision to
21
adopt such an erstwhile reformist policy was intended to cement a
developing rapprochement with Yugoslavia, and explain the successes of
national conununist parties.
The reaction among the present Eurocommunists was mixed. The
French, long ardent Stalinists, decided to praise Stalin's merits and
remain indifferent to the new ideological shift. The Spanish welcomed
the change, but in a manner which belied their devotion to the C.P.S.U.
For the Partito Communista Italiano the situation was perplexing but
potentially advantageous.
The P.C.I. hierarchy had been dominated by dedicated Stalinists
from the late twenties. The issue of De-Stalinization made the Italian
party leaders a bit uncomfortable. In the years prior to the 1956
events, the Italian party had been disrupted by arguments over the
correct road to socialism. In 1950, notable party members had ques-
tioned the P.C.I. policies toward collaboration. This dispute arose
out of the concern that the satisfaction of Moscow's desires was re-
tarding the advance of socialism in Italy. De-Stalinization exacerbated
the pressures by placing doubt on the leadership's political wisdom.
At the top of this hierarchy was Palmiro Togliatti, a dedicated commu-
nist and a former Comintern operative. Togliatti had led the P.C.I.
since 1926. Although he harbored some reservations about Stalin's
consolidation and centralization of power in the late twenties, he
1
3
remained loyal to Stalin's directions. As a result, he and others
at the top came to be closely identified with Stalin and his policies.
The events in Moscow now presented a new challenge. Growing
22
dissatisfaction in both the left and right wings of the party put
increasing pressure on Togliatti. in light of previous Stalinist in-
spired policies, the left wing felt that Moscow was acting to restrain
the revolutionary confrontation between the party and the state. The
right wing of the party was unhappy because it seemed Moscow was deny-
ing it electoral success and direct, meaningful access to the Italian
14
government. After the Yugoslav criticisms in 1947, the party had
followed an ambiguous course.
De
—Stal in ization and the denunciation of the cult of personality
provoked an internal crisis for Togliatti which forced him to deal with
disillusioned Stalinists and renegades alike. In answer to this crisis
he began to shape a policy which would take advantage of the new
positions within the C.P.S.U. Togliatti proposed that serious study of
the situation would reveal that it was not Stalin or his excesses which
should be a point of concern, but rather the nature of the system it-
self. Perhaps Professor Donald Blackmeer's quote from Togliatti suc-
cinctly describes his approach.
Stalin was at one and the same time the expression and
the author of a situation, for the reason that he proved himself
to be the most expert organizer and director of a bureacratic-type
apparat. At the moment when it got the better forms of a demo-
cratic life as well as because he gave a doctrinal justification
of what was in reality an erroneous line, one on which is personal
power was based, to the point of assiiming degenerate forms.
Togliatti also stated that while a high degree of solidarity
within the international movement had once existed, it was time to
recognize that the Soviet party should not be the only model for
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communist organizations. For him, it was apparent that the world
movement had now become polycentric. This observation was a recog-
nition of what the Soviets had already learned through their experi-
ences with Yugoslavia and China. The Stalinists within his own party
were not totally discouraged while anti-stalinists and nationalists
were comforted by thoughts of more ideological freedom. By attempting
to redefine openly the nature of inter-party relations, Togliatti was
leaving the P.C.I. leadership room to satisfy both wings of the party.
Togliatti 's statements were open acceptance of the changing
conditions in the world. His appraisal was delivered to the party
members in a philosophical tone. The fact that such statements came
from a man so closely identified with Stalin underscores the prag-
matism and political realism involved in maintaining the cohesion of
the Italian Communist Party while charting an Italian version of
Marxism-Leninism. Inside the party the Stalinists were not completely
disgraced and they were prevailed upon to agree with the new C.P.S.U.
views in the best Stalinist tradition.
If the reliance on the C.P.S.U. for central direction was
diminished, it was because the Soviet leadership had encouraged a
reevaluation of strategy by its actions. The criticism of Stalin re-
vealed for Togliatti the solution to his party's problems. By demon-
strating that it was not simply Stalin but in fact the Soviet Union
that had gone astray, the P.C.I. could move more positively toward
assuming responsibility for its fate. A concept of polycentrism took
advantage of the Soviet toleration for various revolutionary techniques
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and enlarged upon it so that self-interest and bilateral party relations
were included. Togliatti moved farther ideologically than the Soviets
expected because he foresaw an end to their involvement in directing his
national electoral policies. Soviet direction of parliamentary co-
alitions was not interpreted as a necessary outgrowth of the "different
roads to socialism. " The Soviets had probably meant to maintain their
influence while creating more flexible tactics; but the Italian Party
embarked on a policy which changed the framework of inter-party rela-
tions. It was expected by the P.C.I. that non-ruling parties remain
sovereign in their own affairs and be treated in the same manner as
socialist states under the new polycentric policy.
After 1956 the P.C.I. began a program which considered parti-
cipation in the electoral system to be a legitimate tactic for trans-
forming it.^^ This shift, along with the advocacy of polycentrism,
became the chief ideological contributions of the P.C.I. The institu-
tion of strategy and objectives tailored to fit the problems of the
Italian nation was coupled with the intention of making important
decisions about the direction of Italian socialism within Italy. This
approach posed an alternative program from which Eurocommunist attitudes
subsequently developed.
During the time that followed the Twentieth Party Congress
,
several events took place which served to undermine the Soviet in-
fluence within the socialist bloc. Togliatti 's statements influenced
others to begin criticizing the Stalinist domination of socialism.
There soon developed political unrest in Poland and Hungary. Reformist
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tendencies in both countries forced the Soviets into an ideological
retreat. As national parties attempted to replace Stalinists, the
Soviets became anxious. In Poland reformers were successful in moving
into the Party hierarchy without large scale violence. In Hungary the
situation developed into one of severe internal conflict and Soviet
armed intervention.
After the violence and intervention in the latter part of
1956, the C.P.S.U. leadership attempted to re~impose a more strict
discpline on the affiliated parties. In November of 1957, an Inter-
national Communist conference was held. It was the largest to take
place since 1935 and it had taken one year for the conference to be
organized and convened. There were sixty-five national parties in
attendance. The Soviets were able to regain some control by having
it agreed that although the C.P.S.U might not necessarily be the proto-
type socialist party, the U.S.S.R. was still the leading state in the
international socialist bloc. An agreement was reached so that a
declaration of solidarity could be issued. The concept of "different
roads to socialism" was discouraged and the dangers of revisionism
repeated. These actions made it clear that Soviet leaders had become
concerned with the centrifugal potential of De-Stalinization . Ihe 1957
conference was not entirely successful for the Soviets as it had become
increasingly difficult for the C.P.S.U. to influence the actions of
various parties. Perhaps when the post-Stalinist leaders had formally
recognized the differences in opinion within the C.P.S.U. and other
parties, they somewhat legitimized reformist tendencies. The
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international conference did not put a brake on the growth of such
sentiments. In 1958 the problems of the C.P.S.U. increased over renewed
conflict with Yugoslavia and worsening relations with C.C.P. By the
end of the decade, the international socialist community would suffer
its most severe rupture.
The Sino-Soviet Split
The Sino—Soviet split is an important event in the evolution
of the Eurocommunist positions. The disintegration of relations dis-
rupted the entire communist movement. The division into two bitterly
opposed grounds undercut the Soviet claim to be the leading socialist
center. The Yugoslav crisis and the post De-Stalinization shifts had
undermined Moscow's authority to interpret the correct course for
revolutionary movements. The break with Peking brought the correctness
of The Soviet's own ideology and organizational development into ques-
tion. Chinese displeasure over the C.P.S.U. debunking of Stalin played
a part in the rift. The Soviet policies set forth after the Twentieth
Party Congress were taken to be too conservative and mistaken. By 1960
the C.C.P. had become convinced that the Soviet Union was falling into
a dangerous revisionist policy. Peking perceived this revisionist line
as a serious threat to the purity of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist
orthodoxy. The notion of Peaceful Co-existence and an apparent disre-
gard for Lenin's thesis about the inevitability of a clash between the
socialist and the capitalist states were considered mistakes. Maoism
expected the inevitable confrontation between these two blocs to be
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grave but not catastrophic. The Maoist position was to discount the
importance of nuclear weapons and reject any notion of peaceful rela-
tions between the capitalists aiid the communists
.
This position challenged the wisdom of the C.P.S.U. leadership
and thereby subjected it to a critical review. The C.C.P. rejected
Soviet assurances that peaceful transitions from capitalism to
socialism were possible. The Chinese felt compelled to respond to what
they regarded as a gradualist revolutionary program.^® These attacks
on the Soviets revolutionary credentials were accompanied by the argu-
ment that national liberation movements had become the main thrust of
revolutionary struggle. The Maoists also demanded that the undue inter-
ference in the Soviet aid programs could not be tolerated. Maoism pro-
moted relations of equality and respect. The role of the U.S.S.R. as a
leading socialist state was also rejected. Peking had decided it could
no longer accept monocentric Soviet policies.
The C.C.P. view was somewhat similar to the perspective that
the Italians had developed in that it criticized the organization of
the Soviet state and questioned the correctness of monocentrism. How-
ever, the Italians and the bulk of the Europeans preferred to stay close
to the Soviets. Since the U.S.S.R. had been the traditional patron of
these parties this could be expected. An interesting facet of this
rupture did soon develop concerning the extent of this European
loyalty.
At a conference of international parties in November of 1960,
the issues dividing the C.P.S.U. and the C.C.P. were the center of
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attention. A bitter dispute over ideological rigidity and Soviet
revisionism was followed one year later by open Chinese defiance at the
Twenty-Second Party Congress of the C.S.P.U. None of the European
parties were particularly interested in supporting the Chinese view;
but when the Soviets tried to organize the forroal ostracism of the
C.C.P., they were not successful. The Italians, in particular, were
cool to the idea of formal censure. Such an action would imply con-
demnation of polycentric attitudes and other parties which were
ardently Stalinist were not concerned with justifying Soviet revisionism
through excommunication of the Chinese.
During the years following the Sino-Soviet split many Communist
parties suffered internal disputes over the question of revolutionary
principles. Both the C.P.S.U. and the C.C.P. laid claim to having the
correct revolutionary ideology. While the bulk of the national party
organizations remained more inclined to accept the Soviet revisionism,
small pro-Maoist splinter groups appeared in many parties. During the
1960s however, the Italian, Spanish, and French parties all worked at
moving themselves out of their traditional, isolated, anti-establishment
positions and towards increased co-operation with other political
elements
.
Czechoslovakian Crisis
In 1968 a crisis emerged which had a profound effect on the
relations between the West European parties and the Soviet Union. The
event was the Soviet sponsored invasion of Czechoslovakia. The purpose
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was to suppress reforms taking place within the Communist Party
apparatus. This invasion came as a great disappointment to the West
European parties which had regarded these reforms with sympathy and
interest. The French and Italian parties condemned the invasion. The
Spanish lodged a formal protest with the Soviet leadership and its
complaint was of a more vehement tone than either the French or Ital-
ian parties. Each of these parties considered the implications of the
Soviet power politics to be dangerously imperial.
The Czechoslovak invasion represented a clear threat to the in-
dependence of communist party organizations. The French and the
Italians were vocal in their criticism, but the Spanish party even more
vigorously questioned the Soviet intentions. The Spanish, because of
their size and isolation in exile, paid for their efforts when the
Soviets succeeded in promoting a party schism in 1970. These actions
further alienated some Spanish communists and widened the gulf between
the two parties.
The Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia had undermined the credi-
bility of the Spanish, Italian, and French parties among their nation-
al political peers and it was probably inevitable that these parties
criticize the events. In France and Italy the socialists and
non-communist left parties could exploit the harshness of the Soviet
19
intervention. The same was true of Spain, for the U.S.S.R. had
• •
20
given the Franco prof^aganda machine much anti -communist ammunition.
The Italians, faced with the prospect of a disintegrating centrist
governing coalition, could ill afford to see prospective supporters
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frightened away. Each of the parties needed to disassociate themselves
from the Soviet invasion and reassure the citizens of Italy, Spain, and
F3T3.nch 3.k)oiit thoiir int0nt to pjrssGirvo ncition^,! sovGJTGignty
.
Tho inv3.sion of C2Gchoslov3.ki3. loci tho Itsli^n pHirty to vigw
the C.P.S.U. even more critically. Togliatti had promoted the notion
polycentrism . The Soviet invasion was viewed as the logical con~
sequence of an international strategy which utilized a concept of
bipolarity and the subservience of communist parties to Soviet leader-
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ship. The French position remained notably ambivalent since they
had never been comfortable with polycentrism. The P.C.F. leadership
did not wish to completely disassociate themselves from the C.P.S.U.
and the international character of French membership in the world
communist movement. Some Spanish Party leaders had been enamored with
the egalitarian foundations of polycentrims . When they were rudely
rebuffed by the C.P.S.U. leadership, it became apparent to the Spanish
that they would not be considered equals for quite some time. The
Italians and Spanish began to ignore the Soviet desires and tried to
create avenues for co-operation between Communist parties and other
elements. This included the willingness to accept anti-Soviet atti-
tudes on the part of potential partners.
A Turning Point
This divergence set the one for the 1970s. The Italians,
Spanish, and eventually the French formulated strategies intended to
protect themselves from domestic political isolation. Invariably this
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meant compromise with the center, center-left, or Socialist parties.
The parties deliberately moved toward the mainstream of national
politics. Tlie P.C.F. feared a loss of support to the French Social-
ists. The Italians found they could influence the government by making
themselves the most important coalition partner for the ruling Christian
Democratic Party, The Spanish were interested in reaching a rapproche-
ment with anti-Franco forces for a united front. This was believed
necessary in order to facilitate a post-Franco liberation.
Each of the parties marked carefully the downfall of Salvador
Allende's Marxist government in Chile. The lessons of this collapse
were not lost on the European leaders. They determined that a
center—left coalition with a broad base would be necessary to avoid
reaction and civil disturbance. A successful Socialist-Communist
coalition was simply not strong enough to stand alone, especially
against foreign siibversion like that of the C.I.A. in Chile. It was
for this reason that the leaders of the P.C.I., P.C.F.
,
and P.C.E.
chastised the Portuguese Communist Party for its tactics in the
Portuguese revolution.
By 1976 the parties were openly directing challenges against
Moscow over C.P.S.U. ideology and the usefulness of the Soviet
model. The French, Italian, and Spanish parties presented Moscow with
a united anti-Soviet line when they met at a conference in East Berlin.
Their co-operation consolidated the positions taken in an earlier
communique issued by the P.C.I. and P.C.F., and the Spanish affinity
for the Italian policies. The co-operative effort presents still
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another stage in the evolution of the Euroconununist movement. Although
the parties were not in total agreement, their joint effort provided an
alternative which could not be dismissed as simply the work of one
renegade party. Later these parties' leaders met in Madrid and con-
firmed their common desires. Strict dogmatic stipulations are not a
part of the present solidarity. a free-wheeling style and disagreements
over strategy mark this group. It was at the Madrid conference that
the party leaders publicly accepted the label of Eurocommunists
. The
general thesis of the group was that their parties had the right to
adapt communist tenets to the conditions of their own countries and
retain independence on an international plane. The parties have not
agreed upon a specific and clearly defined program. They choose in-
stead to adopt general principles and tailor them to the specifics of
the individual countries. A combination of broad guidelines supplies
the organizations with the methodology for achieving a democratic form
of socialism in Western Europe. An examination of these guidelines will
further illustrate the basic content of the Eurocommunist movement.
Eurocommunist Trends
There are several trends in the Eurocommunist evolution which
are the result of the Western parties' experiences since 1928. One
such factor has been clearly analyzed by Pio Ulassi
:
The first and most obvious trend is growing independence of
the parties, their cautious but ultimately unequivocal rejection
of any extra-national source of authority or control, including
a strictly regional one. The revolutionary implications of this
change have only partially been tempered or camouflaged by appeals
to "unity in autonomy and diversity. " The unity of the movement
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now appears to be little more than a myth incapsulating
historical memories, vestige loyalties, and fading ideals.
The autonomy of the parties in contrast, is real enough
already
,
and this has enabled the Western Communists to erase
some of the stigma of subserivence to foreign interests. 2
3
The question of autonomy is central to the aspirations of
Eurocommunism. This desire for independence has been evolving since
Kruschev opened the international movement to divergent tendencies in
1956. Palmiro Toglatti's theses concerning the degeneration of the
Soviet state and the concept of polycentrism became an important
foundation for abandoning not only Soviet direction but their model as
well. The Italians openly broke the tradition of Communist Party
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allegiance to the C.P.S.U. Many of the communists' problems had
been the result of their subservience to Moscow. The era of national
liberation groups had been a time for the Italians and the French
Communists to reduce the level of confrontation with the other domestic
political groups within their nations. When the movements were no
longer underground organizations, the Communist Parties suffered from
the return of their allegiance to the Soviet Union. An astute observa-
tion of this problem has noted:
.... The advent of the Cold War unmasked the Communists as
servile defenders of Soviet interests and policies and this
undermined the Communists' own efforts to accomodate themselves
to nationalist and even chauvinist sentiments in their countries.
In addition, the parties' ties to Moscow helped strengthen and
perpetuate precisely those features of communism which (though
based partly on indigenous traditions) conflicted with western
liberal ideas, and thus cut the parties off from the Democratic
groups whose tolerance and co-operation they needed if their
moderate strategies were to have any success. 25
This has prodded today's Eurocommunists to change their position
vis-a-vis Moscow and adopt an autonomous, independent line that is more
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akin to the national communism of Yugoslavs or Chinese than the rigid
"proletarian internationalism" of the Soviets. Having experienced the
disadvantages of being political outcasts in their own countries, the
parties have sought to adopt their own paths to socialism. There are
other parties which choose to remain faithful to Moscow and within the
realm of doctrinal rigidity. This is not true of Western Europe because
the conditions are not similar to those in which the Soviet model
developed. The Soviet Union's prgrams for building socialism and in-
dustrialization are not considered appropriate for countries already
possessing a relatively high degree of industry and a sizable
middle-class. Each country has cultural and national heritages dif-
ferent from the Soviet Union. Tlie parties now wish to become identi-
fied with the dominant political cultures and more sensitive to the
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. .demands of local circumstances. These conditions have led the Euro-
communists to venture forth with their own programs. As challenges
to the parties evolved on both the national and international scene,
the various organizations experimented with policies intended to fit
the demands and conditions of domestic politics and their countries'
foreign affairs. The parties have come to the point of refusing to
accept Soviet Socialism as the model on which to base the new social
. ,
27
order which they wish to implement.
The result of this change in attitude has been basic
re-evaluations of the Eurocommunist parties' analysis of the world
conditions. A nationalist content is something that might be con-
sidered outside the traditional Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy.
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interest in national independence has taken form in the advancement of
theories such as the "Italian road to socialism," "socialism in French
colors," or Spanish collaboration in national coalitions 1 i ke the pact for
liberty. National pride and patriotism are endemic to the new Euro-
communist style. Nationalism is a powerful phenomenon and the Western
Communists have become more comfortable about making it part of their
ideals
.
Tlie revisions of Marxist-Leninist theoretical ideals are said
to be based on the principles of Marx, Engels, and Lenin themselves.
These revisions have resulted in a willingness to abandon principles
such as the "dictatorship of the proletariat, anti-establishment atti-
tudes, and the need for a revolutionary Bolshevik-style vanguard. In
addition, the parties have openly promoted such ideas as freedom of
opinion, freedom of the press, right to strike, free movement, and
2 8
respect for the verdict of universal suffrage.
The Eurocommunists have moved out of isolated positions in their
own countries and into new political and ideological territories.
While the European parties have rejected some of the more familiar com-
ponents in the Soviet interpretations of Marxist-leninist thought, they
have remained willing to approve the Soviet sponsorship of revolutionary
and insurgent movements. This does not prevent them from being critical
about interference by the U.S.S.R. in the internal affairs of sister
parties. The Eurocommunists might pledge their solidarity to "inter-
national proletarian revolution," but this is a matter of their own
prerogative. They are generally not afraid of a confrontation with
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Moscow, although it is not necessarily their desire to provoke one.
The only notable exception to this format has been the actions of
Santiago Carrillo of the Spanish Party. He has often openly attacked
the Soviet Union on a variety of issues and even rejected its claim to
be a socialist state. Aside from Carrillo, the general sentiment within
the Eurocommunist parties seem to be such that if the Soviet Union
sponsors the invasion of a socialist state or represses dissent, then
party leaders may feel justified in speaking out. This is still a
breach in the discipline and solidarity that characterized the previous
period of rigid "proletarian internationalism." In earlier years, few
communists were willing to make iconoclastic statements for fear of
seriously damaging the entire international movement. Some leaders
have been more critical than others, but all have renounced at least
certain aspects of Soviet orthodoxy.
Hie Eurocommunists also disavow any claim to a monoply of power.
They counter this claim with their own proclamations about desiring
electoral mandates for a transition to socialism. The P.C.I. and the
P.C.F. can rely on their records of electoral participation to support
this assertion. Their activities, while sometimes anti-establishment in
tone, have taken place within the context of constitutional democracy,
and in the same manner as those other parties when election turnovers
have occurred. The Spanish Communist Party, only recently legalized,
must build a reputation of such compliance with the rules of constitu-
tional democracy in order to ease its acceptance among Spain's political
parties
.
37
Th0 dGcision to psirticipGtG in nGtioiicil politics instcsd of
the traditional opposition has, for Western Communists, worked to
encourage efforts to broaden the appeal of the parties among electoral
participants. Perhaps the reasons for this are best described as such:
So long as the Communists considered the use of existing
political and governmental institutions simply as an interim
or at best auxiliary strategy of poer, faith in their ultimate
success could survive electoral weakness and parliamentary
impotence. But once they adopted seriously the idea of
non-violent and essentially parliamentary transition to socialism,
electoral and parliamentary strength became a uniquely critical
measure of their success or failure and their prospects.
The Eurocommunist parties are trying to project an image of
responsibility, moderation, and fair play. If they are to successfully
abandon the more conspiratorial nature of their past actions, they must
be able to draw widespread support from the middle-class and those who
do not traditionally vote communist. Even if this new image can suc-
cessfully increase the parties' electoral support, the Communists will
still need political allies. The gains will not be enough to satisfy
the parties' ambitions. Each of them requires help if they are to come
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to power or have a measure of influence on national affairs.
This situation has forced the parties to insist on broad
coalitions and inter-party co-operation. These intentions began to
materialize with a rapprochement or "opening" to some of the other
political groups which participate in electoral contests. Co-operation
is deemed essential and the communists have joined in some type of
effort which will reflect the vagaries of their national conditions.
In each country the strategy of co-operation is dif-ferent.
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France, the French Communist Party must be mindful of the strength of
the Socialists. Therefore the P.C.F. formed a tenuous and unstable
alliance with the Socialist Party to prevent themselves from being
isolated. The Italian Communist Party has been successful in becoming
a partner of the Christian Democrats, though without ministerial repre-
sentation. The Spanish Communist parliamentary strength is small, but
it has become a valuable ally of the Suarez government. Both the
Italian and Spanish have opted for co-operation with centrist parties
because in each country there is substantial fear that even if a
Communist-Socialist government or some other coalition of leftists
forces garnered a plurality (or even a narrow majority) of votes, the
resulting government could not be effective. A violent reaction by
non-leftist groups, similar to that which caused the downfall of
. ^
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Salvador Allende's Marxist government in Chile, is expected to occur.
Accordingly, each party wants to avoid the polarization of political
groups and have tended to approach the issue of a strictly leftist
coalistion carefully. Indeed, the French may be less fearful of reac-
tion than the Spanish or Italians , but they too realize care must be
taken not to seriously provoke the conservative elements.
The tendency for co-operation had become a fundamental quality
of Eurocommunist strategy. Tlie Communist Parties have decided to make
the best of electoral strategies and techniques. The French and Ital-
ian parties have decades of at least some electoral experience. The
Spanish Party has only recently joined the ranks of legalized panes.
This has stunted its growth as a mass party in the past,
but now it may
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be able to reverse this situation. Already, the Conmmnist Party of
Spain has been able to become important to the center politicans by
providing its support. While the French and Italian parties constant-
ly experience difficulty when they demand a greater share of power, the
Spanish have been more modest in their requirements. Since their
strength domestically is small compared to the other parties, this is
to be expected. It would seem that the Spanish will continue for a time
in their moderate course. If this is so, they may remain the most
revisionist of the parties. A closer examination will demonstrate that
the Spanish Party has a long tradition of moderation and restraint.
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CHAPTER I I
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF SPAIN
The development of the Communist Party of Spain has had a great
influence on the nature of its policies and programs. In this chapter,
a general history of the party's evolution and political experiences will
portray the background from which the Eurocommunist positions of the
Spanish have appeared. The Partido Communista de Espana (P.C.E.) first
began in the years directly following the Bolshevik seizure of power in
Russia. The early activities of the organization were marred by in-
stability and structural weakness. In the thirties, the P.C.E. reached
its zenith as a political party. After the defeat of the Spanish Repub-
lic during the civil war in Spain, the P.C.E. went into a traumatic
period of decline under the pressure of Francoist repression. The
fifties, sixties, and the early seventies witnessed an attempt by the
organization to rebuild itself. Recently, in the wake of Franco's
death and an ongoing liberalization of the Spanish Government, the
party has once again become a legal participant in the electoral con-
tests for political office. The General-Secretary of the P.C.E. has
often stated that the course which the Spanish Communists follow in this
new era is tempered by reflections upon the party's past history. It
is therefore important to consider the passage of these affairs.
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The Early Days of the Spanish Conurtun i st
s
The first Spanish Communist Party came into being in 1919. The
formation of this Communist Party was the result of steps taken by
sections of the Socialist Youth in response to Socialist reticence over
joining the Communist International. The Spanish Socialist Party soon
reconsidered its position in light of the defection by members of the
youth group. A delegation was dispatched to Moscow in order to observe
the International’s Third Congress. The two Socialist delegates left
the meeting with conflicting views and the Socialist leadership decided
to remain firm in its boycott of the International. A section of the
party's left wing bolted the organization and formed a second communist
group, the Spanish Communist Workers 's Party, in April of 1921. The
two parties were merged in November of 1921 at the urging of the Inter-
national. This new, unified party was known as the Communist Party of
Spain (P.C.E.).
In its first years of existence the party was unstable. A
succession of quarrels and schisms rocked the party for over ten years
and prevented the Spanish Communist movement from making many new
converts.^ This penchant for divisiveness caused the defection of
members and the intervention by agents of the Comintern. Involvement
by foreign agents in the affairs of the P.C.E. became a regular occur-
rence .
In 1923 the government of Primo De Rivera banned the Communist
Party and forced it to become an underground organization. The Party's
0 fforts at organizing and propagandizing were thus further weakened so
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that during
few hundred
Rivera's dictatorship its menibership was no larger than a
2
Two notable achievements in this period were the recruit-
ment of a National Confederation of Labor (CNT) group to support it and
the promoting of a miner's strike in the Asturias region. These two
simple successes were not sufficient to counteract the centrifugal
forces within the group. Ideological and strategic differences caused
the Party organization to be in a constant state of flux.
The leadership ran afoul of the Comintern in 1927 over a
disagreement about participating in elections that Rivera was holding.
The P.C.E. did not want to get involved even though the Comintern ad-
vised it. It did accept a Comintern decision to oppose both the
bourgeois and socialist parties, but this acceptance of international
discipline only served to further its political isolation. Communists
fought openly with both the Socialists and the Anarchists, thus alien-
ating two pwerful leftist groups. When a Spanish Republic was pro-
claimed in 1931, the P.C.E. pursued attempts to undermine the success
of the new government. The policy of opposition continued despite the
fact that the party had become legalized. Having made many enemies,
the P.C.E. did not fare well in the Republic's elections of 1931. It
polled under five per cent of the popular vote and received no seats in
the parliamentary body called the Cortes . The Socialists and
left-Republicans did well and dominated the new government.
During the early thirties the Comintern began to re-evaluate
its position vis-a-vis leftist and bourgeois parties. In 1932 the
Communist International decided to accept the establishment of the
Spanish Republic as a positive event. Changes in the leadership of
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the Spanish Party were made and Jose Diaz became head of the P.C.E. in
October 1932. This marked a change in the tactics and views which
would eventually lead to a rise in the fortunes of the party. ^ The
results of this change were not immediately evident, however, as it
took another two years before the P.C.E. could begin to increase its
prestige through better relations with other parties of the left. As
the notion of co-operation and coalition against conservative reaction
grew, so did the strength of the P.C.E.
In elections held in 1933 the P.C.E. received one seat in the
Cortes . This was accomplished in the face of a strong reactionary
trend which produced a government dominated by Rightist elements. This
new government began the retraction of reform policies promulgated under
the first Republican regime. In 1934 disenchanted elements participated
in a number of uprisings. The most successful of these was one in
Asturias. Collaboration among leftist groups made this particular
disturbance difficult to quell and far-reaching in its implications.
Though the effort eventually failed, the Rightist government grew un-
easy about its occurrence. This event increased the bitterness between
it and the Leftist parties. For the left it was an important lesson
demonstrating the potential of united and collaborative policies. For
a time, a united leftist action had resulted in a rebellion which had
4
reached the proportions of a revolt.
The P.C.E. had been involved in the Asturias rebellion and
this greatly increased its prestige. The basis for a co-operative
effort had been established. The Spanish Communists were now inclined
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to begin serious efforts at establishing closer contacts with other
lefting parties. The development of a "popular front" strategy within
the Comintern had been inspired by the success of French Communists par-
ticipating in a popular front alliance with French Socialists in 1934.
After 1935, this tactic became an official theme of the Comintern. The
Spanish began to explore the potentialities of the idea and better
relations were soon established with the more powerful Socialist Party.
Once again the Socialist Youth, reflecting an onset of radicalization
within the Socialist Party as a whole, became a point of interface
between the two parties. The Socialist Party leader Largo Caballero
drew closer to the communists ' ideology and the possibility of Soviet
5
assistance. By 1935 the Socialist Youth had banded together with the
Communist Youth to form Juventud Socialista Unificada .
The dissolution of the Cortes and a call for new elections in
1936 presented the parties of the left with an opportunity for electoral
cooperation. The agreement of the organizations to participate in a
united electoral group was cemented by a distribution formula for the
seats in the Cortes . The association was known as the Popular Front .
It was victorious in the electoral contest and 16 seats were given to
the P.C.E. This represented a sharp rise in the size of their repre-
sentative strength and it is clear that the Communist Party greatly
benefited from the arrangement.^
The Sx^anish Socialists were the most powerful of the Popular
Front parties and intended on eventually controlling the new govern-
ment. This appetite for hegemony was fed by the radicalization of
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elements in the membership. The Communist Party worked to exploit this
radicalization while moving itself toward a more moderate stance. The
P.C.E. hoped to restrain the Socialists from embarking on too dangerous
a revolutionary program. This maneuver reflected the influence of the
Comintern on the course of Spanish Communist decisions. The Comintern
had often acted in a manner intended to benefit the diplomatic initia-
tives of the Soviet Union. It was feared in the U.S.S.R. that revolu-
tionary events in Spain would alienate the western democracies to which
Stalin was making diplomatic overtures at the time. Therefore, the
Comintern endorsed a Spanish policy which was to take advantage of
Communism's revolutionary reputation to increase the influence of the
P.C.E. and protect Soviet interests. This strategy was determined by
the dual problems of satisfying Stalin's foreign policy and enlarging
7
the ranks of the P.C.E.
The Civil War
With the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War , the Communists
found it even more important and advantageous to continue in a moderate
role. The party was given the opportunity to further expand its ranks
while pressing the appropriate policies to protect the vital interests
of the U.S.S.R. Guy Hermet describes the reasons for these
actions.
The Communists had in fact nothing to gain from tp^ing
to out o
the Anarcho-Syndicalists and Largo Caballero’s Socialists
in
extremism. It would have been virtually impossible for
them
to have used more immoderate language than these people
have been more precipitate in socialization. Even had
sue
a policy been practicable, it would have been most
un i e y o
detach any supporters from these two political movements
in any
significant numbers, since their popular following
remaine
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substantial in the years 1936-39. By taking a moderate line
on the otlier hand, the P.C.E. was able to gain support of
the mass of the "non-party" public, frightened by the prospect
of an immediate revolution and not at all confident of the
power of the weak republican parties to protect them. At the
same time the P.C.E. was the only more or less reliable of these
parties, whose effectiveness depended almost entirely on the
goodwill and material aid the communists could alone provide
once that the Soviet Union was the only foreign country helping
the Spanish Republic.®
The first few months of the Civil War saw no official communist
involvement in the government of the Republic. In September of 1936,
however, the P.C.E. had placed two representatives in a government that
had been formed by Socialist leader Caballero. The outstanding feature
of the new cabinet was not its Leftist nature, but the strength that
the moderate elements were able to hold for themselves in the face of
increasing revolutionary fervor. The new arrangement strengthened the
government's cohesion by co-opting some of its more severe revolutionary
critics. The Communists had been the advocates of this solution for
9
the preservation of moderation.
In October, 1936, Stalin sent a message to the Spanish Commu-
nists advising them of his support for the survival of the Spanish
Republic. Although some non-military aid had already been sent, after
October the U.S.S.R. became more resolute in its efforts to supply the
Republican government . The German and Italian states had begun to
supply extensive aid to the rebel nationalist forces. Victory by Franco
would represent a dangerous spread in the fascist threat to the Soviet
Union. Nevertheless, the U.S.S.R. vacillated because it feared close
identification of the Spanish Republic with Communism might endanger its
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attempts to establish alliances or security arrangements with the
United Kingdom or France. As late as December, 1936, the Soviet leader-
ship was urging Caballero to be careful not to alienate the
middle-class. The Soviets, already fearing fascism's growing power,
were intent on aiding the Spanish Republic to defeat the Nationalists
but cool to the idea of supporting a socialist revolution for fear
of its international results.
The Spanish Communists were to become the political lever by
which Soviet pressure was applied to the Republican regimes. Since
the U.S.S.R. did not want to risk the establishment of a revolutionary
government, it consistently tried to retard the rebellious fervor of
the government. The Spanish Communists were ordered to restrain the
Anarchist and Socialists from radical pursuits. As George Orwell
observed in his classic work of the Spanish Revolution entitled
Homage to Catalonia :
The country was in a transitional state that was capable
either of developing in the direction of Socialism or of
reverting to an ordinary capitalist republic. The peasants had
most of the land, and they were liley to keep it unless.
Franco won: all large industries had been collectivized, but
whether they remained collectivized or whether capitalism was
reintrodi^^ed would depend finally upon which group gained
control
.
The alliance of the P.C.E. with middle-class elements and
moderates was intended to produce a bourgeois-democratic government.
The events of the war made the Soviets apprehensive about the real
possibility of Spain becoming a Socialist state. Their policy was
executed in a manner to prevent such a situation from developing.
Russian arms were supplied via the Communist Party and its allies who
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saw to it that as few as possible got to their political opponents.
It was because of a complex set of foreign policy requirements by the
U.S.S.R. that the Spanish Communists acted in a counter-revolutionary
manner. The discipline of "proletarian internationalism" demanded as
much
.
As a result of this discipline, the Spanish Communist Party
worked to force Caballero out of office. Since the Socialist politician
refused to tone down his revolutionary rhetoric, the P.C.E. turned
against him and also began violently harassing other revolutionary
parties such as the "Trotskyite" P.O.U.M. or the Anarchists. Caballero
was replaced and new government under Negrin moved to consolidate its
counter-revolutionary position. Once again, Goerge Orwell supplies a
concise description:
The war was essentially a triangular struggle. The fight
against Franco had to continue, but the simultaneous aim of
the government was to recover as much power as remained in the
hands of the trade unions. It was done by a series of small
moves—a policy of pin-pricks , as somebody called it—and on
the whole very cleverly. There was no general and obvious
counter-revolutionary move, and until May 1937 it was scarcely
necessary to use force. The workers could always be brought
to heel by an argument that is almost too obvious to need
stating: "unless you do this, that and the other we shall
lose the war." In every case it appeared that the thing
demanded by military necessity was the surrender of something
that the workers had won for themselves in 1936. But the
argument could hardly fail, because to lose the war was the
last thing that the revolutionary parties wanted.
The Communists' appeals for unity were supplemented by the
use of force and as time passed the P.C.E. pushed the government to
suppress the revolutionary movements. The help of Soviet agents and
provocateurs was often employed to neutralize or destroy Socialist and
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Anarchist groups. By 1939, the Communists had infiltrated the
Republican Army and disrupted its effectiveness. The army
counter-espionage service was transformed into a political police and
utilized to eliminate revolutionary elements. This was at the root of
an anti-government and anti-communist coup in the last days of the
war. The Spanish Republic, outgunned and under-supplied,
collapsed by virtue of its own internal disintegration. Cohesion was
lost because of the ongoing factionalism and strife.
The P.C.E. Underground
The collapse of the Republic and Franco's victory forced the
P.C.E. to become once again an underground movement. After 1939
the P.C.E. organization and membership became distributed between
exile in foreign countries and a clandestine existence within Spain.
Some of the leadership went to France and then on to the Soviet Union.
Most of the exile membership got as far as France and was trapped there
when the Nazi invasion came. Refuge in Latin America was also sought
and some party members turned up in Mexico or Cuba. An internal con-
flict soon developed between the remnants of the central Party machine
in Moscow. This dispute centered over the selection of various party
members to live within the Soviet Union. People considered politically
questionable by the Soviets were either denied access to the U.S.S.R.
or severely restricted in their movement once inside the country. The
crisis resulted in open confrontation when Jesus Hernandez clashed with
the new party Secretary-General Dolores Ibarruri in 1942. This quarrel
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lasted until 1946 when Hernandez quit his disruptive ways and
disappeared.
Within Spain the party organization was badly shattered during
the years of the Second World War. Some feeble attempts were made to
maintain a party structure, but the Spanish police were extremely
successful at preventing any real progress. These conditions in Spain
resulted in a gulf developing between the exile leadership and the
few members left within the country. In 1944 the Spanish partisans who
had fled to France and become part of the French resistance invaded
Spain. The forces were eventually withdrawn when party functionary
Santiago Carrillo determined that the group could not succeed in its
•
• 17invasion of the country.
The invasion, while not successful in its purpose, marked the
beginning of a period of escalated armed resistance to the Franco
government. This policy was expected to incite a war of national
liberation among the general populace. That also proved to be an
ineffectual tactic and a landing by an armed force on Spain's north
coast in 1946 failed. From 1946 until 1949 the P.C.E. guerillas
fought a losing battle with the Spanish forces. During this time the
party advocated a policy of replacing the Franco regime by armed force
with a socialist-style state apparatus.
In the late forties the party was shaken by internal disputes
and the repercussions of the Yugoslav-Soviet rift. The exile leader-
ship criticized the failures of the Party organization within Spain
and acted loyally to root out "Titoist" sympathizers, real or imagined.
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that it found within its ranks. At this time the P.C.E. top leadership
was invited to see Stalin and discuss strategy with him. Stalin urged
the Spanish to expend greater energies to infiltrate the labor organs.^®
Although hesitant about adopting this line of action, the
Spanish Communist leadership eventually undertook a program of Infil-
tration and participation within the labor groups. A strike in
Barcelona in 1951 was the party's first successful experience at en-
couraging mass resistance to the Franco government. By this time, the
guerilla movements had lapsed into silence. After 1951, the Communists
began to make substantial progress in their attempts to organize mass
Participation and infiltrate the officially recognized labor organs.
In the early fifties the party was able to move operatives about more
freely as a result of the opening of the Spanish-French border. This
caused a more thorough appraisal of the actual conditions within Spain
at that time. The party became occupied with a new form of anti-Franco
action in the fifties. The P.C.E. started more frequently to use the
infiltration of student and labor groups as a means for opposing Franco.
In 1953 the party began to actively promote unified resistance to the
government and by 1954 the P.C.E. had stated its preference for a
provisional coalition government. This constituted a further refine-
ment in the P.C.E. policies aimed at creating a post-Civil War,
anti-Franco coalition. Greater participation in the leadership by
Party cadres from within Spain was also instituted during this era.
The Twentieth Party Congress of the C.P.S.U. in 1956 acted to
reinforce the moves towards political coalition that the Spanish had
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initiated. The Soviet denunciation of the "cult of personality" and
the general dimension of the De-Stalinization campaign had its effect
on the Spaniards. Santiago Carrillo addressed the party about this
problem within the P.C.E. and tried to relate it to the predominance
of Civil War era Communist exiles in the top leadership positions. He
admitted that while no one individual was despotically in command of
the Spanish Party's apparatus, it was still true that a limited number
19
of people had great power. The top party officials also debated the
implications that the "cult of personality" might have in regards to
actions they took during the Titoist purges. The question of arbitrary
and sectarian behavior on the part of some top leaders was posed and
some purged members were rehabilitated.
These criticisms of the top leadership did not sit will with
Delores Ibarurri. She was still acting as the Secretary-General of the
Party, but during this time Carrillo and Fernando Claudin pressed for
a greater degree of democracy within the party structure. In the wake
of the De-Stalinization campaign, Carrillo maintained that Kruschev was
in the process of democratizing the Soviet party system and that
Stalin's past actions were aberrations in that model. Claudin pro-
moted a line closwer to that of Palmiro Togliatti, which criticized the
nature of the Soviet system itself. The 1956 invasion of Hungary proved
to be a decisive test for the two Spaniards. Claudin interpreted the
Hungarian actions as a significant rejection of the Soviet model while
Carrillo considered the Soviet reaction necessary to prevent
20
counter-revolutionary activity.
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Despite this disagreement over ideology, the Spanish Party con-
tinued to develop the formula of "national reconciliation." This idea
of "reconciliation" surfaced in 1958, but even before that both
Ibarurri and Carrillo had promoted the idea of concession towards other
elements within Spanish society. m 1958, however, Carrillo was pre-
pared to go further than Ibarurri in accepting the role of the official
unions and in finding an accomodation with Catholic labor organiza-
.
. 21
tions. The intent of all this activity still was to formulate a
united and co-operative political force through which pressure might
be brought to bear on the Franco government. This tactic of creating
a governmental crisis failed during ill-organized strikes of 1958 and
1959. Although this "General Strike" philosophy was not paying the
political dividends expected, Carrillo was successful in deflecting
most criticism of it that came from party membership. In 1959 he
became Secretary-General of the party.
Carrillo argued that the strike policy was working and that
Franco's government was suffering a serious undermining of its legiti-
macy and authority. Elements within Spain argued that in fact the poli-
cy had been ineffective and had jeopardized valuable party cadres. The
most important source of this disaffection was Jorge Semprin and
Fernando Claudin. They argued that economic progress under Franco had
resulted in the institution of a successful capitalist economy which
was employing workers, raising the standard of living, and
short-circuiting proletarian revolution. Claudin in particular seems
to have recognized the emergence of a stronger middle-class element
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not so prone to revolutionary actions.
This basic split over the nature of Spanish society carried
on into the sixties. The official Party line continued to endorse
strikes. To some extent this policy witnessed increased success as the
number of disturbances grew. The strikes helped nudge diverse elements
towards the co-operation that was necessary to organize a unified move-
ment for democratic reform. This notion of a reform movement began to
develop as a more viable alternative to a revolutionary toppling of the
Franco government. Ironically, Claudin was expelled from the P.C.E. for
his criticism, even though this reformist tendency continued to grow.
Carrillo later acknowledged his own transition towards a moderate line
acceptable to the middle-class, but charged that Claudin had been pre-
2 3
mature in his analysis.
The party also suffered from disenchantment among its members
on its left wing. Militants were concerned about its willingness to
reach accomodations with other Spanish political elements under the
guise of the national reconciliation policy. Thus a split occurred
when pro-Chinese elements bolted the party. They were followed by
Trotskyite and Maoist splinter groups. These defections were not as
severe as the Claudin expulsion or the actions that were to follow.
The Spanish Party After the Czechoslovak Crisis
The events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 further damaged the party's
structural integrity. The Communists had started to initiate a
rapprochement with middle-class elements that were in the trade union
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and political organizations. They also had continued tVieir own efforts
infilatrat ing and influencing labor organizations. Since the P.C.E.
had committed itself to accomodation with other parties in an effort to
organize opposition to Franco, it had moved closer to the principle
of a democratic transition period. In order to maintain their credi-
bility, it was necessary for Spanish Communists to take a firm posi-
24tion on Soviet intervention. In addition, the P.C.E. had been slowly
evolving its program in accordance with the aspirations of its own
leadership. This growing independence was threatened by the Soviet's
proclivities for interference and intervention. The P.C.E. response
to the Soviet invasion was vociferous and more critical than others.
The Spanish had supported the reform initiatives undertaken in
Czechoslovakia, and their criticisms of the actions taken by the
U.S.S.R. left no doubts about their displeasure over the course of
events there. The Soviet Union was not receptive to this criticism and
the response was one of insult to the P.C.E, This proved to be a
decisive turning point for the Party and its Secretary-General. From
25
this time onward Carrillo fostered a growing anti-Soviet line.
The anti-Soviet stance precipitated still another crisis for
the party. A schism developed between elements loyal to Carrillo and
those who had pro-Soviet inclinations. The leaders of the "Sovieto-
philes," Eduardo Garcia and Augustin Gomez, were expelled from the
party in 1969. Enrique Lister, who had also criticized Carrillo for
being anti-Soviet, anti-Marxist, and nationalistic, left the party
in 1970. The Soviet Union encouraged these people to set up rival
Although these new elements suffered fromCommunist organizations.
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their own internal disputes and factionalism, their flight from the
P.C.E. was a serious blow in terms of party morale and prestige. Lister
had been a highly regarded hero of the Civil War days and his absence
put Carrillo's leadership and the policies of the Party under close
scrutiny by many within the underground movement.
After 1970, the Spanish Communists and other political groups
stepped up their efforts to reach a common understanding about the
direction of their policies vis-a-vis the Franco government. In the
early seventies the parties had come to realize that Franco would not
be toppled from his position. The new problem was to decide which
course of action should be taken to profoundly affect the post-Franco
transition that would ultimately take place. At first, the options
looked bleak, for the formation of the Carrero Blanco government ap-
peared intent to carry out a holding operation instead of a transition
period. Such a strategy would delay the liberalization and democrati-
25
zation of the regime. In 1973 Blanco was assassinated and the Franco
government was forced th change its tack.
The political parties opposed to Franco sensed the potential
advantages that a co-operative effort might bring. The P.C.E. moved
closer to the neo-capitalist elements wishing for reform in late 1973
and by mid-1973 Carrillo along with ex-Opus Dei theorist Rafael Calvo
had announced the formation of the Junta Democratica . The Jionta's
manifesto called for a provisional government, amnesty for political
prisoners, trade union liberties, the right to strike, freedom of
the press, independent judiciary, separation of church and state.
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elections, and entry into the Common Market. The Socialists and the
Christian Democrats chose to steer clear of the pact and fonned a rival
27group. In any case, most parties except for those on the extreme
left, had accepted the strategy of moderate coalition.
The Francoist government soon came under increased pressure by
these groups to liberate and democratize itself. The authoritarian
regime experienced a severe strain as 18 per cent inflation and labor
unrest threatened its stability. To complicate matters further. Franco
himself became ill and died in 1975. The Democratic Junta and the
Socialist-Christian Democrat Democratic Platform had joined as Franco's
death drew near to call for a referendum that would decide what form the
post-Franco government would take. The two groups continued to pressure
the government which was placed under the tutelage of Prince Juan Carlos
after Franco's death. Tlieir efforts resulted in the freeing of many
polltl*^^! prisoners. Although some repression and arrests followed
this initial overture, the government did not continue its severe re-
pression. From Rome, Carrillo encouraged demonstrations by all elements
of the Spanish people to illustrate their desire for reform. Sugges-
tions by a government official that Carrillo be allowed to return to
Spain were treated as scandalous, but its very mention exemplified a
growing tendency to ease restrictions against the P.C.E.
Although the new government pledged to keep the Spanish Commu-
nists in check, the increasing violence and civil disruption attempted
to undermine its authority. By March 1976 the Democratic Junta and the
Democratic Platform had foirmed a united front. This front, called the
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DGmocratic Coordination
,
allowed the P.C.E, to outmaneuver the govern-
ment and avoid its exclusion from the political reforms. Communist
labor leader Marcellino Camacho and others in the group were arrested
and held for advocating change in the Spanish government. The P.C.E.
continued to pressure the government with mass rallies which mocked the
official ban placed upon it. In Rome, Carrillo announced his return to
Spain, but the government refused him a passport. The Democratic
Coordination pledged to organize demonstrations throughout the country
for wider reforms. More Communist organizers were arrested, yet
flagrant displays of defiance by other party members continued.
Carrillo, who had clandestinely entered Spain, was arrested and then
released. With his release came de facto recognition of the P.C.E.
Shortly afterward, the Spanish government declared the P.C.E. a legal
party. This event placed the Spanish Communists officially within the
arena of electoral politics and secured for them the same conditions of
participation that existed for the Communist parties in France and
Italy. Given this condition, the P.C.E. has since embarked on its
self-proclaimed Eurocommunist strategy. The Communist co-operation with
other political elements had benefited the Party, since the Spanish
government had proved unable to isolate and exclude them from the
political arena. From 1976 onwards, the P.C.E. has proclaimed itself
a party of Eurocommunist intentions in order to clearly define its
strategy as a legal party seeking electoral status. The stress on
democratic reform has continued, and the party has again taken its
place as a participant in the Spanish government.
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The organization of the P.c.E. has been criticized for not
being democratic. The structure of the party is fundamentally very
similar to those in other countries. The rule of democratic centralism
makes it difficult for internal opposition to be effective in influ-
encing the course of party policy. This rigid command establishment
seemingly encourages disunity because it does not allow for satisfactory
conflict mediation. Divergent viewpoints must seek expression in the
form of splinter groups. The Spanish Party has on numerous occasions
been debilitated with dissent and rent with sectarianism. The condi-
tions of clandestine operation and a leadership in exile often served
to exacerbate the situation. Now that the P.C.E. is once again legal,
perhaps its functions will encounter less internal tension.
The structure of the party resembles that of a pyramid. It
consists of local committees, sector committees, regional, provincial,
and then a central committee. Members of the Central Committee are
elected by regional and provincial representatives in a Party Congress.
The Central Committee appoints an Executive Committee and the
General-Secretary of the party. The Central Committee is expected to
convene plenums for the purpose of general policy discussions.
During the Party's underground existence many of these functions
were difficult to execute. Widescale repression had made interface
between rank and file and leadership difficult. Santiago Carrillo has
recently declared that there must be more open discussions in the Party
now that it has been legalized. Although some dissidents continue to
28
be purged, the internal affairs of the Party have become more visible.
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Whether or not the Party will be able to continue on the road to in-
ternal democracy will depend on the particularities of the Spanish
situation and the personalities who succeed Carrillo. In the meantime,
however, the Spanish Communist Party remains a Party of divergence
searching for a satisfactory element of cohesion.
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CHAPTER III
SANTIAGO CARRILLO AND THE EVOLUTION
OF A EUROCOMMUNIST POLICY
Having discussed the general nature of Eurocommunism and the
fundamental background of the Communist Party of Spain, it is now pos-
sible to explore the development of these Eurocommunist tendencies
within the country. In entering into any such discussion, it is use-
ful to consider the career of Santiago Carrillo, Through his position
as General-Secretary, Carrillo has become the determinant force in the
development of the Spanish variant of Eurocommunis
. It is his ideas
that may make him the most outspoken of all the Eurocommunists. Tlie
Spanish Party has evolved its own particular strategy in the years
since it began, and Carrillo's career has been intertwined with most
of this growth. Carrillo was, in his early years, committed to the
Comintern's directions. He later pursued the policy of "national
reconciliation" which can be viewed as a prelude to the fashioning of
a distinctive Eurocommunist position. In 1968, his party's criticism
of the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia was a bold step to-
ward the expression of autonomy from the U.S.S.R. Events such as
those in Chile continued to influence the Gene ral- Secretary ' s analysis
of the fotrunes of west European Communism. By the mid-seventies,
Carrillo had become a major spokesman for Eurocommunist themes and the
driving force behind the Spanish Communists' passage to this position.
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Carrillo's Early Career
Santiago Carrillo was born in 1915. His father was an ardent
Socialist and became a Socialist Party functionary. Carrillo himself
was a member of the Socialist Youth and eventually its Secretary-GeneraL
The Socialist Youth was the "Bolshevik" left wing of the party and
courted by agents of the Comintern.^ In March 1936, Carrillo visited
the Soviet Union and in April 1936, the Socialist Youth and the Commu-
nist Youth merged. Carrillo joined the P.C.E. in November of that
year after becoming convinced that only the Communists would be capable
2
of effectively resisting the national rebellion. This decision coin-
cides with the first real Soviet efforts to supply military aid to the
Spanish Republic.
Throughout the war Carrillo carried out several tasks for the
P.C.E. It was during this time that he became acquainted with Palmiro
3
Togliatti, who was acting as a Comintern agent. Carrxllo came to
regard Togliatti highly and found himself greatly influenced by the
Italian Communist's personality. In a 1974 interview, Carrillo men-
tioned this admiration when he told the interviewers
:
He was an extraordinary personality. I believe he was the
most cultivated, the most intelligent leader in the communist
movement. It was he who went most profoundly into the problems
after the 20th Congress, and he might have gone into them still
more profoundly if conditions had been more favourable.
It is clear that Carrillo's respect for Togliatti lasted past the Span-
ish Civil War and affected his own future ideological views.
Carrillo was one of the last Communist leaders to leave Spain.
He fled to France, then to the Soviet Union. From there he moved to
the
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United States, but differences of opinion with American Communist
Eugene Dennis led him eventually to Cuba. During this time Carrillo
was acting as an agent of the Comintern and bound by its rules of
discipline and proletarian internationalism. Yet, after a stay of some
months in Cuba, Carrillo left for Mexico without clearing his actions
with Moscow. There he worked for elements of the Spanish Communist
Party in exile. Since Carrillo's main task soon became working for the
Spanish Party, he was sent to Buenos Aires. From there he maintained
direct contact with Spain. He eventually migrated once again to
AEgeria in 1944.
This period of service for the Comintern has been considered by
Carrillo to be the most appropriate conduct for the time. He has
agreed that the Comintern did act as an instrument of the Soviet Union,
but he has defended that situation by repeating that the primary task
of a good Communist was to defend the first worker's state in the world.
Of his association with the Comintern and his experiences with the
international Communism at the time, Carrillo has said:
For me, at the time, the defence of the U.S.S.R. came
before everything else, to such an extent that if I had been
asked in 1936 "Are you in agreement that the revolution should
triumph is Spain at the cost of that in the U.S.S.R. collapsing?"
I shouldn't have hesitated to answer" "No," because the U.S.S.R.
was a continent in itself, an immense force capable of carrying
the world movement on its shoulders, whereas in little Spain our
triumph would have only been ephemeral. One has to remember what
the period was like.^
This unswerving loyalty to the Soviet Union was a condition which many
Communists adhered to. Carrillo was to continue in this deference
until well after the 1956 De-Stalinization campaigns.
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In 1944, Carrillo was planning an invasion of Spain when he was
directed by the Spanish Conununist leadership in the Soviet Union to go
to France. From there he was quite active in directing the Spanish
guerilla movement which tried unsuccessfully to unseat Franco during the
late forties. in 1946 he was part of a provisional Republican
govemment-in-exile in which he was given the position of Minister with-
out Portfolio. The Communist Party participation in such an exercise
did not halt it from continuing its guerilla struggle. By 1948,
however, Joseph Stalin had decided a change in tactics was needed.
Thus, it was that top Spanish leaders including Carrillo, were in-
structed to have party members infiltrate government sponsored labor
organs. Although Carrillo maintains he was hesitant about this policy,
it was soon accepted as a party strategy.
Also accepted by Carrillo and a good many other Communists was
the Stalinist interpretation of the Soviet-Yugoslav rupture of 1948.
Titoist elements were found to be existing within the P.C.E. and
Carrillo was quick to act in urging they be purged. Carrillo's own
interpretation of this period is that it was a mistake to have so blind-
ly followed the Stalinist lead, but that this failing was not apparent
at the time. It is essential to realize that the internal politics of
the party, although strongly influenced by Stalin, were played out
against the backdrop of this crisis in the international movement. In-
ternal differences among political leaders may have been settled by the
most expedient means available and charges of ideological heresy might
have been motivated by conditions within the party. It is known that
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many of the "Titoites" were Communists who either threatened the com-
mand of the P.C.E. or who were leaders in the underground within Spain.
It is also common knowledge that the relations between internal and ex-
ternal elements suffered greatly, from a lack of commianication and un-
derstanding. The record does show, however, that Carrillo was a willing
accomplice in many of the purges of the era.
De-Stalinizat ion in Spain
This devotion to the Soviet Union also continued into the
fifties. At that time the Spanish party was beginning to consider
co-operation with bourgeois elements to force a government crisis for
the Franco regime. Carrillo joined the Spanish Communist Political
Bureau in 1954 and he was later instrumental in the Spanish version of
the De-Stalinization campaign. His speech at the plenum meeting of
the P.C.E. Central Committee in 1956 dealt with the problems of the
"cult of personality. " Carrillo agreed in principle with the Soviet
view that Stalin's actions were an aberration. He maintained his
loyalty to the ideal of the U.S.S.R. being the leading state in the
Socialist world and he did not become as ideologically revisionist as
his mentor, Palmiro Togliatti. He did seem to agree with ^the potential
of the "different roads to socialism" theory. He had already begun to
consider rapprochement with the moderate opposition and the Catholics
to be a useful strategy.^ Carrillo's tactics became increasingly
moderate in order that a policy of national reconciliation become a
useful tool in rallying opposition to the Franco government.
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In promoting the policy of "national reconciliation," he was
determined to expand the influences of the Party into as many sections
of the political spectrum as possible. In this respect he was willing
to have Communists form alliances with Catholics, Socialists, and others
who would be willing to enter into an anti-Franco front. These poli-
cies were not always popular, but Carrillo energetically promoted them.
This enthusiasm made him a highly visible member of the party in the
fifties. His willingness to pursue rapprochement policies in the face
of Colores Ibarruri's reserved stance helped him to capitalize on an
element of discord within the Party. He was able to ride a wave of
inner-party reform into the position of Secretary-General. This move
marked the beginning of Carrillo's domination of Party apparatus and
ideology. In this sense the sixties and seventies have been the "age of
Carrillo" in the Spanish Party.
After his rise to the top of the Party, Carrillo was not in-
clined to accept criticism from below. The most obvious example of
this in the sixties was the expulsion of Fernando Claudin. He held
the reins of ideological interpretation firmly and directed the Party's
policies with the intent of making it part of a wide Democratic Front.
After Carrillo's ascension, the Spanish party began to move more
resolutely towards reaching accomodation with middle-class elements and
intellectuals. It was expected that among Catholic workers a new
potential for co-operation would become possible. During the early
sixties the main thrust of the Spanish policy continued to be "national
reconciliation." The interest for reform in a wide anti-Franco front
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was coupled with Communist attempts to infiltrate labor organizations.
After 1964 the P.C.E. showed a growing attachment for the fun-
damental concepts of Palmiro Togliatti's analysis for the prospects of
international socialism. Carrillo had long admired Togliatti and had
considered the Italian approach to socialist transition to be a valuable
source of inspiration. When Kruschev was removed as head of the
U.S.S.R., the Spanish reaction reflected Italian influences. The P.C.E.
questioned the nature of the Soviet system. The Spanish
General-Secretary remarked upon this:
But I believe it was Togliatti who was from 1956 onwards,
after the 20th Congress, had the clearest insight into the
question of speaking of the system
,
and it is true that at
the time conditions were not favourable for him to develop
his ideas. But the essence of the problem certainly is the
political system of socialism.
^
By 1964 the head of the P.C.E. apparently felt the time had come
to begin developing these ideas more fully. In 1965 closer contacts
were established with the Italian Communist Party and later in 1966 more
intimate relations began with the Rumanian Communists. With these
steps, Carrillo began to develop more independence from the Soviet
Union.
In 1967, Carrillo published a pamphlet entitled A New Look at
Present Day Problems. This work contained an overture to progressive
Catholics within Spain and, more importantly, it discussed the relevance
of the Soviet models of socialism for Spain. He criticized "Stalin's
error, " which consisted of generalizing the Soviet forms of the dic-
tatorship of the proletariat and making those forms a theory of uni-
8
versal validity. The importance of developing a revolutionary
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ideology suited to the conditions of Spain was stressed. A
self-criticism over the party's failures at revolution in the past was
offered as well. The pamphlet discouraged elements that sought the
guidelines for revolutionary action solely in the past experiences and
conditions of the Soviet Union or any other revolutionary movement.
There were many quotes from Engels and Lenin which were intended to
demonstrate that strategic and political flexibility must be part of
the revolutionary ideology.
In 1968, Carrillo addressed the Executive Committee of the
P.C.E. on international issues. In that speech he credited the role
of nationalism in socialist revolution. He also considered the role
of the Soviet Union in world affairs and commented on the extent of
its intervention.
A policy of direct intervention in every quarter of the
globe, utterly foreign to the socialist character of the Soviet
regime, would have caused it to degenerate and become trans-
formed into a new Bonapartism.
The Soviet Union and its Communist Party have had the wisdom
to maintain a judicious policy of help for those people strug-
gling, without affecting the national character of that
struggle of meddling in the internal affairs of other
countries .
^
The General-Secretary, although developing a theory of inde-
pendent action, was still able to reconcile this need for specific
revolutionary programs with the foreign conduct of the Soviet Union
and the role that it played in influencing the international socialist
movement. In the text of his speech he urged action by Europe's
Communist Parties to seize upon the revolutionary potential of the con-
vergence of middle and working class desires. He said that it was
increasingly important that each Communist party should know how to use
73
the autonomy and independence which were present in structures of the
international Communist movement.
This did not prevent the Spanish leader from underscoring
the importance he still attached to the role of the socialist states in
the preservation and development of socialism.
There is one essential point of departure when one starts
talking about the socialist countries, and that is the recog-
nition that these countries are the vanguard and the strongest
bastion of world revolutionary movement.
Among the socialist countries, the U.S.S.R. occupies a
fundamental place which is determined by history, by the
U.S.S.R.'s immense potential and by its international policy.
We Communists regard solidarity with and defence of the
Soviet Union and those countries where the socialist revolution
has triumphed as a fundamental duty.^^
This statement exhibits a belief that the Communist parties
could still regard the Soviet Union as the premier socialist state.
He did acknowledge, however, that the duty of defending socialism ex-
tended to protecting even the Chinese should they find themselves
subject to imperialist attack. This indicates that Carrillo was willing
to deviate from the Soviet's monocentric view openly in order to recog-
nize the validity of Chinese socialism. In doing so he was implicitly
promoting a polycentric approach.
Carrillo then moved on to one last important recognition, which
would influence the future development of the Spanish Eurocommunist
line. He endorsed the events that had recently taken place in Czecho-
slovakia in which the Novotny leadership had been replaced and steps
were being taken to democratize the Czech party and state apparatus. He
indicated that the experiences of Czechoslovakia once again confirmed
that socialism was a system that could foster the broad participation
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of the working class, the intellectuals, and the people.
Throughout the sixties the Spanish party had worked to create
the conditions for re-establishing itself as a mass party. This course
was made even more difficult by the fact the organization was not
legally recognized. In order to rebuild the party's strength and func-
tion effectively within the Spanish system, the P.C.E. was developing
its own parameters for co-operation. It appears that by 1967 or 1968
Carrillo had come to recognize notions of polycentrism and mutual
respect among parties to be natural and accepted rules of the interna-
tional Communist brotherhood. The Spanish had declared in 1967 that
they considered themselves in sole charge of their country's progress
towards socialism. Therefore, support for both China and Czechoslovakia
were to be expected in this recognition of self-determinism. The P.C.E.
was willing, it would seem, to follow the Soviet Union as a leading
example of socialism, but no longer consider the best arbiter of each
party's interest.
The desire for autonomy and non-interference along with the
ability to formulate specific, nationally oriented programs also seems
to have been expected by the Spanish. This expectation was not met
by the Soviets willingly. It became apparent to the Spanish and also
the French and Italians that in order to be granted this independence,
it would be necessary to demand it. Carrillo's words about Soviet in-
terference and Bonapartism were prophetic when one considers the events
which occurred at the end of 1968. It was from this period onward
that the Spanish party started to become an important influence on the
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Eurocoimnunist development. This notoriety and influence was not the
product of some arbitrarily arrived at policy but the result of the
historical conditions of both Spanish politics and the relations of the
Communist Parties to the Soviet Union.
Carrillo versus Moscow ; 1968
The first significant contribution for the Spanish Communists to
the Eurocommunist movement dates from the events following the 1968 in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia. The P.C.E. response to the intervention of
Warsaw Treaty forces in Czechoslovakia went further in its criticism
than that of either the French or Italian Communist Parties. When the
armies invaded Czechoslovakia in August of 1968, the P.C.E. leadership
lodged a formal protest with the Kremlin. This protest was treated in
a cavalier manner and the Spanish party was admonished for its audacity
in criticising the Soviet Union.
Santiago Carrillo's response to the Soviet moves was disappoint-
ment and dismay. The Soviet Union had not only shown a complete disre-
gard for the internal affairs of a socialist state, she had dismissed
the views of an erstwhile faithful and loyal servant as immaterial and
unimportant. The Executive Committee of the Spanish Party expressed
its distaste for the Soviet Union's actions and they declared that
Czechoslovakia's internal problems should be resolved from within. Then
the Spanish criticized the conduct of the U.S.S.R. in their party news-
paper as being ill-conceived and mistaken.
Even though the Spanish Communists were the most critical, they.
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like other west European Conimunist Parties, were still not inclined to
emulate the Chinese Communists and suspend their relations with the
U.S.S.R. Indeed, it would seem that Charrillo chose to retreat a bit
when he wrote in late 1968:
Those Communist parties, including our own, which have
disapproved of the intervention, stress at the same time that
nothing has altered in our attitude towards the Great October
Soviet Revolution, towards the Party of Lenin or towards the
Soviet Union. . . . We continue firmly to defend the Soviet
Union and all socialist revolutions, which constitutes the
highest gains of the world working-class and the forces of
progress
.
Those who cherish illusions about the emergence of a
"new Communism" of a geographical nature, of a "western
Communism" like those who once cherished illusions about a
"national Communism "--a re in for a rude awakening.
Carrillo thus tried to preserve the integrity of the interna-
tional movement. It must be remembered that, at this time, the United
States was engaged in a war with the People's Democratic Republic of
Vietnam, another socialist state. The signs of a lack in solidarity on
the part of the international movement might have given the United
States encouragement in its pursuit of the war. This did not keep the
Spanish Party from calling for an acknowledgement that national senti-
ment is an important political force that cannot be lightly dismissed.
It had to be admitted that diversity did exist and that to rebuild unity
this diversity must be recognized.
Carrillo also noted that socialist states played a dominant role
in determining the direction of the international movement and that
non-ruling parties were being treated as weak sisters constantly in need
of guidance. His reply to this situation was that no Communist Party
which seriously proposes to make a socialist revolution within its own
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country could accept the position of a satellite or place itself in the
orbit of another party. He maintained that each party needed to plot
its own revolutionary course, taking into account the concrete situa-
tion within its own country while applying Marxist-Leninist thought in
a creative and original way.^"^
Carrillo defended diversity within the socialist camp as not
only a reality that could not be ignored, but a manifestation of a
healthy socialist group able to deal effectively and practically with
the conditions particular to each member. In this respect he went on
to write
:
It must be understood that diversity is not a sign of
weakness, incoherence or confusion, nor of abandonment of
principle. Diversity is essentially a sign of strength, of
development it is a characteristic of the great strength of
our movement and its roots in the life of the people.^
He also defended the concept of national interest as being an
acceptable consideration for any party. This, of course, is an import-
ant change of attitude for the Spanish Communists. The P.C.E. had not
hesitated in the least when it was necessary to sacrifice the Comintern
directives. It was for this reason that the Spanish General-Secretary
wrote
:
Today a real Communist Party, nationalist and internationalist
at one and the same time, must maintain its own independent
character, its own strategy, its own concept of the application of
Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of its own country.
The invasion of Czechoslovakia was considered as unjustified
ideologically or strategically. Carrillo's position had come to be
that there was no need for intervention because the resolution of reform
within Czechoslovakia was the business of the Czech party. He then
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enlarged on that premise to state that while there would be no schis-
matic break with Moscow on the part of Western Communists, the C.P.S.U.
had to accept the validity of diverse policies within the international
movement. Common strategies on common problems may in fact be possible,
but there could not be one specific strategy or program which could be
universally applied.
It would seem that the Spanish did not intend to cause an
irreparable split between themselves and the Soviets. To do so would
have been an ill-conceived policy considering the fact that the P.C.E.
was an illegal party in need of refuge for its exile leadership and
support for its party infrastructure. The insubordinations of the
Spaniards was more vocal than those of the Italian and French parties,
but Carrillo was careful to try and appease the Soviets in an article in
Nuestra Bandera . Nevertheless, the incident touched off internal dis-
sent on which the Soviets sought to capitalize.
Two Central Committee members living in the Soviet Union,
Eduardo Garcia and Augusto Gomez, refused to accept the Party's stand
and began a campaign to discredit Carrillo. Other members of the P.C.E.
living in the Soviet Union denounced this activity and the "dividing and
splittest" activities of the two members. It was clear to these people
that the Soviet Union was resorting to the time honored device of try-
ing to split the party. It was claimed that the two were sending let-
ters, documents, spreading confusion and creating distrust, thus bring
ing discredit to the policy and decisions adopted by the Central
Committee
.
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Tliese two dissidents were expelled from the Central Committee
and later from the party. They persisted in their efforts to vmdermine
the Party leadership. ZU^other member of the Party, Enrique Lister and
four other Central Committee members were expelled in 1970 after they
too repeatedly criticized Carrillo. Lister and the others formed a
rival party and published their own version of the Spanish Communist
newspaper, Mundo Obrero .
The actions of these dissidents, backed by the Soviet Union,
caused Carrillo to draw closer to the Yugoslav and Rumanian parties
and confer with the P.C.I. The Spanish Party's radio transmitter was
moved from Czechoslovakia and into Rumania. Carrillo also solicited
support from the Italian and Belgian Communist Parties over the ex-
pulsion of pro-Soviet elements. Carrillo blasted east European coun-
tries for their sudden willingness to establish relations with the
Franco government as a betrayal of Communist solidarity. The Soviet
Union was held responsible for this action and others designed to under-
mine the position of the P.C.E. In 1970, the Soviets shipped coal to
Spain in order to relieve the pressure from coal-miners strike in the
1 ft
Asturias region. Such actions as these only further embittered the
Spanish Communists and encouraged the P.C.E. to deviate further from
the Soviet orbit at the end of the decade
.
An Increased Desire for Autonomy
The actions of Carrillo and the Spanish Party during the first
years of the seventies were intended to further the success of a
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specifically Spanish policy designed to form a broad anti-Franco
coalition. The willingness to work with the elements from the Falange
,
Opus Dei
,
Catholic organizations and other interested elements such as
intellectuals and students became the main domestic concern. The rela-
tions between the P.C.E. and the C.P.S.U. were strained but not sus-
pended. The Spanish remained content to explore closer contacts with
other Communist Parties while also investing their energies in endorsing
the Pact for Liberty . First begun in the Catalonia region, this common
understanding continued into 1974. After the death of Carrero Blanco,
the P.C.E. intensified its drive towards accomodation with the
middle-classes. During the summer of 1974, the Democratic Junta was
formed so that a more formal organization could be used to galvanize
a broad anti-Franco movement. The assassination of Blanco, destined to
be Franco's successor, added an enormous momentum to the activities of
the party. With this increase in interest, the Spanish Party began to
openly flaunt its self-proclaimed independence from Moscow and clearly
define its national and international policies.
The anti-government coup in Chile had a sobering effect on
Carrillo's strategy. He and other European Communist leaders were con-
cerned about the ramifications that the affairs in Chile meant for the
course of socialist transition in Europe. Carrillo's own analysis of
the situation led him in 1974 to plan a strategy based on these
observations
:
As I see it, there are three lessons to be learned from it:
1. It is essential for the proletariat to remain allied with the
middle strata and not become isolated.
81
2. If you try to carry out a socialist experiment alonq theDemocratic road and if you don't have the support of the majorityof the people, you must be able to resign in good time fromgovernment, so that tension doesn't degenerate into civil warand must submit the question to universal suffrage, so that yiutry to return later when you are stronger.
3. When you propose to remain in power, you should take all
the necessary measures to fight at the right time, if the enemy
abandons legality and resorts to force.
These statements reveal a clear illustration of the development
of the Eurocommunist positions for domestic action. Allende's troubles
in Chile influenced many of the Communist leaders who were in the pro-
cess of developing Eurocommunist strategies for their parties.
Carrillo, like other interested parties, had concluded that the lessons
of Chile could be applied to both the Spanish situation and other
European countries as well.
It was Carrillo's aim to develop a strategy which would active-
ly involve the P.C.E. in political co-operation with other groups to
avoid polarization. Since Spanish Communist policy had long intended
to create a broad, moderate, anti-Franco popular front, the adjustments
made after the Chileein coup were not really extraordinary in nature.
As Carrillo so bluntly put it:
. . . either one does this, which will make it possible to
emerge in a new situation and turn socialist aims into something
i^eal--or else one preserves one's "revolutionary virginity" and
does nothing. That is the problem . . . our Party is capable of
conducting this policy of broad union, of convergence, even with
the neo-capitalist sectors, without becoming trapped in these
tactics and while maintaining all its strategy. ^0
On the subject of international affairs and the world Communist
movement, Carrillo had also reached a number of conclusions. Alexander
Solzhenitsyn's book Gulag Archipelago had given rise to new anti-Soviet
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feelings within Europe. The revelations contained within the work
were damaging to the Soviet Union's prestige. Carrillo supported
Solzhenitsyn's actions and wondered why the Soviets should repress what
he considered constructive criticism. This marked a renewal of the
Soviet-Spanish conflict. Carrillo was also willing to join with other
European Communists in criticizing the Portuguese Communist Party for
its actions in the wake of the coup which swept Caetano from the lead-
ership of that nation. Carrillo went so far as to declare that the
events of Portugal demonstrated the correctness of the line that the
Spanish had been developing. He maintained that progressive Spanish
elements, including some in the army, could and should be courted by the
P.C.E. He stated that, "The possibility of a compromise with the
neo-capitalists has never arisen until now. Before the events in Portu-
gal, practice had never demonstrated that the choice of such a course
was correct.
In June of 1975 the head of the Italian Communist Party, Enrico
Berlinguer, and Carrillo issued a statement at Livorno which criticized
the Portuguese and underscored a co-operative line that was developing
between the Spanish and the Italians. The P.C.I., which had undertaken
its own program of moderation and compromise , had been uneasy about the
Soviet actions vis-a-vis Solzhenitsyn. The Italians had also recently
encountered difficulties in their relations with the C.P.S.U. and they
found it comforting to make common cause in resisting Soviet pressures.
During this time the Soviets were pushing the parties to organize an
all-European Communist Conference with the intent of re-couping their
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position as the leading state in the world socialist movement.
It IS interesting to note that the French Communist Party leader
Marchais had in May of 1975 criticized the Chinese for deserting
Marxism-Leninism. Marchais referred to Iten Hsiao-Ping, then on an
official visit to Franch, in a contemptuous tone. He appeared to stop
just short of calling for the ouster of the Chinese leadership and
praised the merits of Stalin. Marchais rejected the idea that West
European Communists were divided between a "centralizing" or pro-Soviet
22group and one that favored autonomy. This event was accorded greater
notoriety than the Carrillo-Berliguer meeting a month later. The most
ironic quality is that six months later Marchais and Berlinguer issued
a statement in Rome which was intended to demonstrate French-Italian
autonomy and insure the appearance of French independence from Moscow.
The French maintained the action was aimed at the Portuguese who had
tried to bypass a popular democratic process. This event was front page
2 3
news and considered a dramatic ideological statement.
It is clear that the Spanish Communists had earlier reached
this analysis concerning the Portuguese and had taken action to
demonstrate their position. The fact that it was a small party, whose
existence within Spain was still clandestine, obviously affected the
visiblity of the P.C.E. and the importance accorded to its actions.
This, however, does not contradict the evidence that the P.C.E. was one
of the first Eurocommunist parties to explicitly define its position
vis-a-vis Moscow and the Portuguese coup.
It was during 1975 that the Spanish Communists were steadily
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employing the tactics of rapprochement with the middle-class and
neo-capitalist elements in an effort to bring about a democratic revolu-
tion. The last half of 1975 witnessed an upsurge of violence and ter-
rorism as the Francoist government began to de-stabilize . The Commu-
nists were responsible for acts of defiance, but the violent activities
'within Spain were the product of a variety of groups covering a wide
range of the political spectrum. The P.C.E. was devoting the bulk of
its attention in this part of 1975 to pressuring the Spanish government
for the democratization and liberalization of the regime. The pressures
for reform continued throughout 1976. In June of that year Carrillo
attended the tluropean Conference of Communists in East Berlin. At this
meeting, Carrillo, who had yet to see his own party become legalized,
attacked the Soviet Union and insisted that there was no directing cen-
ter. It was important for Carrillo to establish his independence from
the U.S.S.R. at this point, because the struggle within Spain for demo-
cratic reforms was being intensified. The Communist-led Democratic
Junta and the Democratic Platform had joined forces in March. In April
there had reportedly been a suggestion by some officials of the U.S.S.R.
that the Spanish Communist Party leadership should and would be changed
24
,
if such action would make the party legal. This suggestion must have
angered Carrillo and contributed to his conduct at the European con-
ference .
Leonid Brezhnev had opened the conference with a conciliatory
speech which conceded that each national party owed its allegiance to
the working-class of its own nation. Carrillo then attacked the Soviet
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leadership after this speech. Italian Communist leader Berlinguer
took a less antagonistic line against the Soviets. Other party leaders
promoted the idea of greater autonomy, though none other than Carrillo
was as critical in their statements.
In his speech Carrillo stated that the essentialy question in
Western Europe was how to arrive at an landerstanding with the Social-
ists, Social-Democrats, Christians, radicals, and other movements with
democratic convictions. The plans for socialism would have to be based
on a respect for political and ideological pluralism, without the rule
of one party and in accordance with elections. He stated that diversi-
ty was a necessary and important part of the international movement.
He insisted that no one should elevate his own conceptions to the rank
of dogma and that the character and position of each party should be
respected
.
After the conference had disbanded Carrillo had further com-
ments for the international press about the course of socialism within
Europe and Spain. It must be remembered that Carrillo was speaking at
a time when his own party was an illegal organization which was involved
in a popular alliance designed to pressure the Spanish government for
a liberal, democratic regime. When interviewed after the conference,
Carrillo chose to make his actions comparable to those of Martin
Luther's rejection of Rome's authority.
Yes, we had our Pope, our Vatican and we thought we were
predestined to triumph. But as we mature and become less^a
church, we must become more rational, closer to reality.
Carrillo continued on to point out that each individual has a
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private life and individual perception. m this respect, Carrillo
assured the interviewer that a person's choice of friends, music,
literature or even religion had nothing to do with the Communist
party, which must be concerned with problems of politics and social
struggle. The course he had chosen was expected to renew and expand
the appeal of the party. He emphasized once again that diversity was
a healthy and valuable quality for Communists to enjoy. Heretics, he
postured, were usually correct and ahead of their time while conserva-
tism was a condition which discouraged party vitality and vigor.
As for the nature of conditions in Spain, he insisted on the
need for a bourgeois democracy. Given this premise, Carrillo foresaw
a situation in which the Communist parties of Spain, France, and Italy
could compete and co-operate with various political groups for the
right to rule their nations. Their desires for electoral victory
would be coupled with each party's hopes for affecting their countries'
internal policies without external interference. To this end, Carrillo
attempted to define the nature of the competition that would exist.
We want a type of socialism with universal suffrage,
alternation of government, not control of power for the
Communists, but an alliance of forces that in no way would
allow a Communist monopoly.
He later spoke of the way in which the system would function as the
fortunes of parties rose and fell.
We mean the Communist party could be in one co-alitiion
government, and if it lost out in the next elections, it
would be outside. Some economic changes would have been
achieved and would remain, but there would be a whole range
of political issues. 27
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From this interview it is clear that Carrillo actively sought
the appearance of a moderate, almost reformist, line. For the success
of the party in Spain this would be a necessary course. Wild radical
policies and the advocacy of revolutionary tactics would have played
into the hands of the post-Franco government that was hoping to isolate
the P.C.E. The Conference in East Berlin had afforded him much publi-
city and a chance to send a message to both the Francoists in power and
the coalition partners of the Front working to pressure the Spanish
regime. The course the Spanish leader chose at this meeting marked
him as a political renegade and pushed him to the forefront of the
autonomy movement within West European Communism. Neither the French
nor the Italians had gone as far as Carrillo in objecting to Soviet
influence.
The question of the necessity for this extremism must be enter-
tained with the French and Italian reticence in mind. Carrillo ob-
viously had much to gain by opposing himself to Moscow. The giant power
against a small, but courageous party and its leader, was certainly a
scenario which could produce a high sense of dramatic effect within
Spain. The P.C.I. and the P.C.F. must not have felt the same need for
posturing as they remained less vocal in their differences of opinion
with the Soviet leadership. In light of Carrillo's past experiences
with the C.P.S.U., and especially its remark concerning a leadership
change, it is not surprising that he would appear at the conference with
such an anti-Soviet line.
It might have been Carrillo's desire to embarrass the Soviets
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through his actions. He could exploit the image of a small, illegal
party, challenging the omnipotent Soviet party and escaping essentially
unscathed. The post-conference press coverage was a coup for the
Spanish, because they emerged from the conference as celebrities, while
the Soviets had to suffer the indignity of insubordination by one of
Communism's lesser parties.
It does not seem likely that in this case, Carrillo and the
Spanish Communists were consciously playing the role of ideological and
political vanguard for the Italians and French. Each of these parties
had made its own declaration of autonomy publicly long before the meet-
ing. Both parties were substantially larger than the Spanish party, and
both were fianctioning as legal parties within electoral systems. The
French and Italians could have benefited by the anti-Soviet, nationalist
position taken by the Spanish much sooner than the P.C.E. It would seem
that whatever Carrillo's intention when he scored the Soviets, he was
not acting specifically as a "point-man" for the Italians and French.
Whether he intended to or not however, Carrillo had expanded the
boundaries of dissent within the international movement.
After the conference, it was the P.C.I. and the P.C.F. which
endeavored to come to Carrillo's aid. The heads of all three parties met
in Madrid in early 1977. It was at this meeting that the three stressed
that their parties should be known as "Eurocommunists." They took this
to mean that each party should have the right to adapt Communist tenets
to the conditions within its country and retain its independence on an
international plane. This call for independence was likely to be a
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benefit for the Spanish in their own dealings with suspicious domestic
allies. For Carrillo, the prestige of having Marchais and Berlinguer
visit Madrid and make common policy with him must surely have helped his
position inside the P.C.E. Within the Spanish political scene, a
Spanish party independent from the Soviet Union would greatly ease the
fears of Spanish politicians who remembered the Civil War and the un-
swerving loyalty of the P.C.E. to the Comintern.
If Carrillo were to make his new Eurocommunist policies success-
ful, he would have to convince the Spanish populace of his sincerity.
He had been pushing a line of national reconciliation since the fifties.
During the sixties he had come to consider the strategy of alliances for
the purpose of attaining "bourgeois democracy" to be the most prudent
course for his party. After 1968, his increasingly independent attitude
had helped him to overcome the Civil War legacy. In the early seventies
he had managed to establish a working understanding with other political
elements in Spain. He had taken the initiative in speaking out on what
he considered foolhardy Communist policies in Portugal. At the Berlin
Conference he had made himself the most visible anti-Soviet party lead-
er. In bringing Marchais and Berlinguer to Madried, he was once again
gathering momentum. Although neither the French nor Italians were pre-
pared to go to the reformist extremes he sometimes pushed, Carrillo was
intent on establishing his own credibility as a bonafide "Eurocommu-
nist." It was therefore a logical step for him to define his Eurocommu-
nist ideology. He did this in a tract which presented his views to the
Spanish public and all the others. This statement appeared as a book in
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1977, entitled Euroconununism and the State
. It is Carrillo's projec-
tion of a new, more autonomous European Communism. It is his primary
definition of the general aims of Eurocommunism and the specific con-
ditions of the Spanish Communists' variant.
Eurocommunism and the State
:
Carrillo's
Eurocommunist Views
In the introduction to his book, Eurocommunism and the State,
Carrillo states that there is no precies definition of Eurocommunism.
He is convinced that practice outpaces theory and therefore theory is a
2 8generalization of practice. The Spanish General-Secretary is quick to
point out that Eurocommunism is a tendency, not an organized movement.
There is no one common program, simply an interest in general prin-
ciples. It would be incorrect to consider Eurocommunism as a "third
force" because this notion itself runs contrary to the basic themes of
autonomy and particularity. Eurocommunist attitudes should not be
considered a re-capitulation of more traditional social-democratic
tenets
,
but a re-evaluation of the revolutionary conditions in certain
types of states in the world today. Indeed, Carrillo has at times re-
garded the label "Eurocommunist" to be a misnomer because the underlying
assumptions might also be valid in other industrialized, westernized,
states such as Japan.
The key to understanding the revisions in Marxist ideology
that Carrillo proposes lie in what he assumes to be changes in the
modern state. These revisions are totally in keeping with his
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conception of the spirit of Marxims. He is concerned that his position
not be mistaken for a social-democratic revisionism or an opportunist
ploy for a political acceptance. The primary intention is to develop
a "firmly based" conception of the possibility of democratizing the
capitalist state apparatus, thereby adapting it for building a socialist
society without its forcible total destruction. The transformation of
the State apparatus is of utmost importance, and this must be carried
out according to the dual considerations of ideology and objective
reality. Carrillo makes an issue of the need to closely observe the
development of the means of production in any socialist transformation.
The technological and economic accomplishments of a society must serve
as the basic foundation for the transformation of the State apparatus.
He states
:
Socialist relations of production which rest on an insuf-
ficiently developed basis of the productive forces, can have
only formal socialist aspects, in the same sense as we refer
to formal freedom in Bourgeois society.
It is possible for there to be an ideological commitment to
socialist transformation, but it is inevitable that the development of
the means of production become a concern of the socialist vanguard. It
is at this point, Carrillo believes, that leaders commit the "anoma-
lies" and "aberrations" of history as they try to force economic de-
velopment. In that observation, an insult to the Stalinist heritage
can be recognized, and also an explanation of why it occurred. It is
Carrillo's intention to put some ideological distance between himself
and past Soviet developmental models. He also wishes to disown any
conservative ethic of Soviet Marxism which contradicts the need to
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re define existing social and economic relationships.
For this purpose, it is necessary to consider the changes in
the structure and function of the State that have taken place since
the passing of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. it is said by Carrillo their
attitude toward the state was that it was an instrument for the domina-
tion of one class by another. Carrillo also acknowledges further
contributions by Gramscii and Althusser which define the ideological
apparatus that supplements the coercive character of the State.
Carrillo adds to these facets still another factor.
. . . . one should now add another dimension which the capitalist
State is increasingly assuming as representative of the major
dominant economic groups: The control of economic development,
which means that those parts of social activity which escape the
direct intervention of the State become constantly more insigni-
ficiant
.
Carrillo considers the modern State still an instrument of
domination, but the structures and roles of the State have grown to be
far more complex than those which Marx, Engels, and Lenin had analyzed.
As a result of its new functions, Carrillo considers the modem capital-
ist state to be a Director State which involves itself in all sectors of
31
the economy as both employer and guardian. Within the Eurocommunist
countries this description of the modem state is easily recognized and
applicable. In France, Italy, and Spain there is a mix of private and
state ownerships in which the governments play an important part. The
Spanish government was in fact the focus for modernization and develop-
ment within that country. The Italian and French governments have also
moved into the forefront of their national economies.
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Carrillo explains that this form of state intervention no longer
serves the whole of the bourgeoisie which modernization has created.
Presently, the only sector whose interests are served is that of the
monopolistic groups which control the economically fundamental indus-
tries and concerns. This creates a situation in which there is a con-
frontation by not only the proletariat but also directly by the broadest
social classes and strata including some of the bourgeoisie. This pro-
vides the potential for a common political interest among various seg-
32ments of the society against monopolistic interests.
This development is betrayed by a crisis of the ideological
apparatuses of the State. For Carrillo's Eurocommunist strategy, the
absorption of these control apparatuses by the rising socialist trends
is an important strategy. He states that:
The strategy of revolutions of today, in the developed
capitalist countries, must be oriented to turning these
ideological apparatuses around, to transform them and utilize
them—if not wholly then partly—against the Statepower of
monopoly capitalism.
Carrillo expects there to be an opportunity for the Spanish
Communists, and the Italians and French as well, to take advantage of
the crisis developing in certain appendages of the State apparatus.
Through prudent manipulation of these crises the Eurocommunist can speed
the convergence of the diverse political elements.
The first such sector which is undergoing a crisis is the
church, and more especially for Spain, Italy, and France, the Catholic
Church. Progressive elements are beginning to question the basic di-
mensions of a policy which has kept the church closely allied with
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conservative interests. Carrillo maintains that there is a potential
for creating an understanding with Catholic elements over the aspects
of capitalism which run contrary to Christian notions. Appeals can now
be made not only to the Catholic working class but also to the theolo-
gians and intellectuals within the Church hierarchy. This potential
has been made more evident by the appearance of worker-priests in
France, de facto recognition for the Communist vote of the Catholic
working class in Italy, or the political accord that has often been
struck-up with Catholic labor organs in Spain. The controversy over
the "theology of liberation" is still further proof of the possibilities
which exist for Marxist-Christian dialogue. This attempt at closing the
classical anti-clerical breach is considered by Carrillo to be of utmost
importance throughout the Western European scene.
The opening of education to greater sectors of the population
has provided what Carrillo considers to be another source of revolu-
tionary potential within both Spanish society and also those of Italy
and France. He consideres the needs of the modem state to have pro-
moted the pre-conditions for a Marxist appeal to the non-monopolistic
segments of society.
There is no doubt that this has been induced by the end of
education as the privilege of a small aristocracy, isolated from
the people; by the spread of mass education as an imperative for
technological development, and the fact that the extraordinary
growth of the means of production objectively carries within
itself—even before socialism—the tendency to sweep away dif-
ferences between manual and mental labour.
Such a crisis in education has for some time been evident in France
and Italy and it is also appearing more frequently in Spain. This
has
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thB possibility foir gx’Ba.teir pa]rticip3.tion by ihoitb divBirss 6ls~
ments in programs intended to bring about socialism through electoral
means. Carrillo believes when underemployment or unemployment begins to
affect the educated elements, they will become increasingly radicalized.
As with the Church, the Eurocommunist position is to take advantage of
this process in order to mobilize those disaffected elements for support
of Communist Party initiatives.
Carrillo also sees a general crisis affecting such areas as the
family, the legal system, and the destabilization of European political
systems. He is much less specific on each of these subjects and he is
also brief in a discussion of the role of the communications media. He
does make it quite clear that the problem Eurocommunists must tackle
is the struggle to win positions which dominate the ideological
apparatuses with revolutionairy ideology. He explains that this does not
mean only one party should influence such areas, but that all revolu-
tionary and progressive forces must combine to reverse the traditional
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roles of these apparatuses.
Therefore, developed capitalism presents for Carrillo a likely
pre-condition for socialist transition. This is because the changes
that have taken place within advanced capitalist systems have provided
the revolutionary left with a number of opportunities to establish its
credibility among broad sections of the middle and working classes.
Among these changes that Carrillo has pinpointed are the following:
(1) The development of productive forces and the use of mass education
to support this development. (2) The inability of private enterprise
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to organize this development and the increasing intervention of the
State in underwriting private enterprise. (3) The assumption by the
State of social functions which the State must undertake to avoid im-
balance and serious social conflict (welfare state). (4) The sharpening
of differences between the oligarchic minority and the rest of society.
Carrillo notes here a consumer society less able to fulfill its desires.
Thxs is the "proletarianization" of professional people. (5) The
greater dependence on nations which are continually increasing the
price of their raw materials. He explains that just as bourgeois
society was formed in the womb of the feudal regime, so socialist socie-
ty has matured in the womb of developed capitalist society.
Also of great interest to Carrillo is the coercive apparatuses
of the State. This is, of course, particularly significant in the
Spanish situation because of the Army's traditional restraining role in
politics. In both France and Italy the Army and the state security
forces have also shown signs of a strong conservative bias. However,
Carrillo notes that recently within Italy and France, sections of the
state security forces have begun to reconsider their conservatism and
to support revolutionary parties. He sees the same possibility in
Spain, but it will be necessary for the Spanish, the French, and the
Italian Eurocommunists to continue to exploit these tendencies. This
can be accomplished by adopting a new attitude toward the security
forces. Part of this new attitude is to recognize the need for police
forces, but with narrower parameters for action.
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The forces of public order, the police, should exist to defend
society from anti-social elements, to control traffic, to protect
the population. Popular demonstrations and strikes are not
conflicts of public order. . . . ^^
This view is willing to concede the necessity for the police
apparatus, but insists that they not be used for political purposes. It
is indeed an ironic statement for a Communist Party General-Secretary
to make. In the context of Spanish politics, however, it is to be
expected. The past Francoist policy of suppression of political op-
position had heavily relied on the State security forces and the Army to
quash any serious threats.
Carrillo wants to end the traditional role of the Spanish army
as an internal security force and organize it for the specific purpose
of national defense. He calls for a moderation of the army and a great-
er degree of professionalism in its ranks. In order to accomplish this,
the army must be de-politicized and the officer corps must be democra-
tized. In calling for a professionalism and modernization, Carrillo
writes :
The forces of the left, and particularly we Marxists,
must actively tackle military problems as a very decisive
component in the socialist transition of society.
Carrillo is convinced that society cannot be transformed with-
out changing the State, and in order to change the State its army and
police forces must also be changed. He offers the army modernization
in return for a democratization of its structure and its abstention
from politics. He regards the army as a necessary safeguard on nation-
al independence, but makes it clear he cannot accept military meddling
In keeping with his other theses of reversing thein social issues.
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traditxonal roles of the State apparatuses, Carrillo poses the question
of whether a democratic transformation of the military can be attained
through a social crisis other than war. He provides the reader with
the answer that if the role of the military can be restructured so that
officers become technicians, scientists and intellectual educators of
men skilled in protecting Spain from external aggression, then this
section of the State apparatus will no longer be an obstacle to social-
ist transition.
... in this modern conception, the military man is not
a member of a kind of closed order, isolated from and above
society but a participant in a teaching body devoted to imparting
certain specific information to the citizens so that they can
defend the country's territorial integrity in case of need.^^
This is far removed from the traditional role of the Spanish
army. The Eurocommunist platform calls for the military retreat from
the field of politics and its retraining as a viable defense force. The
Communist Party must have a military policy which can attract the pro-
fessional military man and redirect his involvement. If a democratic-
ally installed government intent on socialist transition is to remain
stable and survive, Carrillo considers this military reorientation an
absolute necessity within Spain.
The dimensions of democratic transition to socialism lie at the
core of Carrillo's Eurocommunist tract. Carrillo recognizes that in
order to make this Eurocommunist transition agreeable to the
middle-class sectors he must accept the co-existence of public and
private forms of property. The integration of the social forces is
destined to come about in a natural process without coercion. Social
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and political differences will exist, but the basic control of the means
of production will move increasingly into the public sector. Carrillo's
vision of this enlarging of the public sector includes provisions for
technocratic direction tempered by input from organized labor forces.
Criticism of the Spanish Eurocommunist policies as reformism is
ignored by the top Spanish leadership. The conditions and analyses
attending the other socialist transitions throughout the world are
viewed as complex and particular aspects. Each party has acted accord-
ingly and every revolutionary situation has its own characteristics. It
is Santiago Carrillo's position that his Eurocommunist themes are the
best possible for the Spanish. He considers them to be the product of
a concrete reality. in this manner, he refuses to accept the criticisms
of the Soviets or any other Communist party over strategy in the Spanish
Communists' conduct of their domestic programs.
For socialism to proceed democratcially in Spain, the validity
of the democratic process must become accepted fully by all the politi-
cal participants. Both the right and the left have often denigrated the
parliamentary method. The success of fascism is said to have demon-
strated not the uselessness of democracy but the powerless position of
a divided working class without middle class partners. Now, says
Carrillo, the time has come in Western Europe when true socialist forces
can become part of the government through universal suffrage. Once in
power, they must still be subject to popular approval in order to assure
accountability. Eurocommunist parties must be willing and able to
accept criticism of their programs without violent or suppressive
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reaction. since these parties themselves have adopted critical atti-
tudes toward the political systems of other socialist states, Carrillo
expects self-criticism and the complaints of others to be considered
useful as well. He is very quick to point out that he distinguishes
between serxous criticism and slander. Yet he repeats that:
The masses must have the right to deprive their elected
representatives of their mandates if they do not fulfill them,
and to elect new ones. They must have the possibility ofintervening at all levels of power, in the economic, social,
and cultural fields; this underlines the value of forms ofdemocratic self-management and peoples control.
This intervention includes the right to demonstrations and political
strikes. Only terrorism, violence, libel and slander are considered
anti
-democratic and anti-social.
The Communist Parties in Western Europe are now on the verge of
undertaking new roles and functions and the Eurocommunist parties should
continue to be the vanguard of socialist transition. This is held to
be especially true since they are now the prophets of a new creative
Marxist conception. However, these organizations must no longer con-
sider themselves the only parties capable of organizing political forces
for socialist transition. The Eurocommunist attitude towards competi-
tion from other socialist parties should be one of respect and healthy
competition. This is a far cry from the practices of the Spanish Civil
War when the P.C.E. worried as much about the far-left parties as it did
the Francois t forces. If modern Communists are to accept the historical
validity of Marxism, then they must also realize that non-Communist
parties are capable of unconsciously being part of the eventual social-
ist transition.
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The Communist parties are also expected to further democratize
themselves and to elicit a new wave of creative opinion. Collective
discix^line must be maintained, but outside of the party's political
tasks the members should be free to participate in their own private
interests. Culture, art, science, humanities, and the like are not to
be disciplined. It is these elements which should provide the basis for
a continuing re-appraisal of the party's own direction.
The West European Communist Parties cannot aim to be the sole
political force in the societies or states. Their role must be that
of contributing to the victory of progressive forces and the attainment
of socialism. There is no question of a party obtaining a monopoly of
power, for each progressive element must combine in a co-operative ef-
fort which reflects the strength and political significance of the
participants
.
This means a "rectification" of the traditional roles of the
Communist parties. These rectifications are the result of changes
that the advanced capitalist societies have undergone, and means there
will be a "new political formation.
"
The idea of the new political formation is linked with that
of the hegemony of the bloc of the forces of labour and culture
in society. . . . That is to say, this new political formation
would be something like a confederation of political parties
and various social organizations, which would act on a consensus
basis, respecting the individuality and independence of each of
the parties and organizations.'^^
Each party or segment would retain their own independence.
though they would continue to endorse a co-operative effort for the
restructuring and reorganization of the society and the economy. T
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formation of such a widespread common effort cannot be accomplished in
a single tactical maneuver. The Eurocommunists must build it one
step at a time, aided by the Communist Parties' careful formulation of
programs intended to deal with social crises as they arise.
This Eurocommunist approach is not a political ploy by the
Soviet Union. Carrillo is adamant in his position that these policies
are "an autonomous strategic conception in the process of formulation,
born of experience of those concerned and of concrete reality." ^ It
is not a continuance of Soviet policy, but one which is aimed at being
independent of super-power spheres of influence. At times, Carrillo
appears to advocate a socialist United States of Europe.
. . . The socialist forces of each state cannot detach
themselves from a certain common strategy on the European level.
This tendency, in order to maintain itself and achieve victory,
needs coordinated action on a European scale. It is precisely
this that can contribute decisively to the creation of a united
Europe standing on its own feet, bringing the continent's re-
sources into play and making it possible for it to fulfill a
role of its own within the global balances of forces. 43
Eurocommunism is not concerned with the administration of the
modem capitalist states in Europe, for its intention is to transform
them. It promises to bring about a convergence of a socialist, social
democratic, democratic parties, and progressive Christians in Spain and
throughout the rest of Europe. Having accomplished this, the European
states would then be able to better organize themselves for their own
benefit. Carrillo's aim is to have a Europe independent of both the
U.S.S.R. and the United States.
Spain will then exist in a Europe of peoples, oriented toward
44
socialism, in which it can preserve its own individuality. The
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structure of Western Europe's political institutions (Parliaments,
pluralism, decentralization, separation of powers, etc.) can be utilized
and enhanced in Spain by a socialist economic reorganization. It will
also be necessary for the Spanish to open new channels of trade and
commxanication to the Third World and socialist countries. Furthermore,
the P.C.E. will not push for actions that might encourage the leaving of
large sums of investment capital. Carrillo considers it unlikely that
economic transformation will happen in one stage. He is therefore pre-
pared to allow foreign investments which underwrite Spanish development.
This will mean that investments of foreign capital and
the functioning of the multinationals in our country will not
that foreign capital in Spain
Carrillo's view, and Spain's main concern must be that foreign invest-
ment be integrated into a national plan and kept from interfering in the
internal affairs of the Spanish state. Carrillo is realistic about the
terms of trade and commerce in the world economy.
The laws of the market, with certain exceptions dictated by
the needs of political solidarity, also govern, the commercial
relations among socialist countries, and these countries often
give preference to commercial transactions with capitalist
countries because of technological advantages and favorable
^• 4-46credits
.
He criticizes the nature of trade imbalances within the East European
COMECON arrangement. This is why a Spanish Eurocommunist economic
policy will have to co-exist with foreign capital investment in its
future. The key elemnt in this relationship must be the continued in-
dependence of the Spanish state to pursue the growth of socialism.
This capitalist-socialist symbiosis is already taking place in
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It is Santiago Carrillo's position that the Eurocommxanist
parties generally agree on the need to advance socialism with democracy,
a multi-party system, parliaments, representative institutions, popu-
lar input through universal suffrage, trade unions independent of the
State and political parties, freedom for oppostion, human rights, reli-
gious freedom, freedom for cultural and scientific creation, and the de-
velopment of popular participation. The parties must also maintain a
total independence from an international leading center in their rela-
tions to socialist states. Solidarity with the Third World countries in
their struggles against neo-colonialism and imperialism from any quarter
is another important component. Each of the Eurocommunist parties is
striving for cooperation and peaceful co-existence while overcoming the
international organization of military blocs, the dismantling of foreign
bases, the prohibition of nuclear weapons and international policy of
disarmament.
Carrillo recognizes that the parties have not all developed
their policies in exactly the same manner or at the same time. He does
insist that each of them share these common policies. He acknowledges
the long and difficult path by which each of the parties have come to
these positions. Carrillo's contribution to the Eurocommunist movement
cannot be denied. There may vexry well be questions about its political
feasibility or ideological consistency, but there is no question about
its direction. The Spanish Eurocommunist position is very often criti-
cized by the Soviet Union for its aspirations and contents. The Soviets
denounce the Spanish for their revisionist attitudes while their own
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response has constantly been one of profound mistrust. These reactions
have characterized the prevalent Soviet conceptions of Eurocommunist
autonomy as a whole. In order to successfully employ their programs,
the Eurocommunist parties will have to court their respective domestic
electorates while reacting cautiously to the foreign policies of this
Communist super-power
.
Reactions to Carrillo's Theses
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union reacted strongly to
Carrillo's document. The leadership of the C.P.S.U. considered it to be
a serious threat to the heavy Soviet influence upon the ideology of the
international movement. In the June 25, 1977, issue of the Soviet
magazine. New Times
,
an editorial appeared which harshly criticized
Carrillo's book. It accused him of trying to pit the Communist Parties
of Western Europe against the Soviet Union and its socialist allies,
discredit existing socialism, and the formation of an anti-Soviet bloc.
The Soviet article also stated that
:
The concept of Eurocommunism is erroneous also because it
affords grounds for assuming that what is in question, as has
been rightly scored in many documents of Communist Parties, is
not some specific features of strategy of Communist Parties of
some countries, but some sort of specific brand of Communism.
Yet there is only one Communism—if we speak of true, scientific
Communism—mainly that whose foundations were laid by Marx,
Engels, and Lenin, and whose principles are adhered to by the
present day Communist movement
.
The Soviets maintained that Carrillo had mistaken strategy for
ideology. They also assailed him on his desire for a non-aligned
Europe
.
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... The underlying idea is the "union" of Western Europe
on what is in effect an anti-Soviet platform. No wonder
Carrillo's projections of this kind meet with approbation on the
part of bourgeois propagandists and ideologues . '^8
It was the Soviet position that Carrillo's intention was to split the
international socialist movement. The Spanish Gene ral- Sec retary ' s
analyses were rejected as being solely in the interest of imperialism.
Long passages of the editorial then went on to extol the revolutionary
virtues of the Soviet state in an answer to the criticisms that were
perceived in his Eurocommunist text. The editorial then questioned:
How other than anti-Soviet can one qualify Carrillo's
monstrous statement that the Soviet Union is to blame for the arms
race, and that it pursues great power objectives? What other
interpretation can be given to his slanderous allegations that
the Soviet Union makes use of the class struggle and internation-
alism as an instrument of achievement of precisely such aims 7^9
The article went on to attack Carrillo's credibility and en-
couraged the membership of the P.C.E. to carefully consider the impli-
cations of following the General-Secretary's leadership.
Today too, the C.P.S.U. holds that the highroad of relations
between our parties is the road of friendship, co-operation,
and joint struggle. However, Carrillo's crude anti-Sovietism is
plainly causing considerable damage to these relations. Responsi-
bility rests with him.^^
The Soviet Union had apparently taken quite seriously Carrillo's
Eurocommunist positions. An editorial in the New York Times later re-
marked that it was not the Spanish strategies that provoked criticism
or endangered Soviet interests, it was the publication of Carrillo's
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ideas which the C.P.S.U. feared would be disruptive.
Within Spain, the Soviet remarks were treated simply as an
attempt to discredit the P.C.E. and damage the co-operation being forged
among the Eurocorammiist parties. The Spanish Communists' Central
Committee responded with a statement which read:
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For Spain and for other capitalist societies with similar
characteristics, the way called Eurocommunism offers the only
valid alternative for the advanced socialism.
Carrillo lamented the timing of the attack because of its potential
consequences
:
My only complaint was that the attack was not launched 8
days before the elections, because probably it would have
gotten us many thousands of votes. ^3
The Spanish Communist Party continued to appear unconcerned and unified
in the wake of the Soviet criticism. While some internal differences
were reported to have surfaced, the public image was one of cohesion and
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strength.
The Yugoslav party was quick to come to Carrillo's aid. It
attacked the Soviets for the way in which they had responded to
Carrillo's book. The following statement illustrates tne Yugoslavs
feelings
.
Tliese methods are one of the reasons that the so-called
"real-socialism" that exists in nations like the Soviet Union^,.
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cannot be presented as the actual model of socialist society.
The Italians also supported the Spanish, but not as aggressively. The
P.C.I. said its position called for a Europe independent of the
U.S.S.R. and the U.S. The Italians also noted that Carrillo's book
contained some mistakes and ambiguities. The French Communists simply
reprinted the Italian statements and then commented that the "Soviet
denunciation where anathema replaces a profound analysis of complex
problems comes at a time when the Spanish Communist Party is conducting
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a difficult and courageous struggle to liquidate the aftermath of
dictatorship in Spain.
"
Tlie responses of the Soviets and also the other Eurocommunists
removed any doubt about Santiago Carrillo becoming the most radical
Eurocommunist leader. Neither the Italian or French parties were will-
ing to go as far as the Spanish in responding to the Soviet criticisms.
The Italian Party openly admitted in their newspaper that their posi-
tion was somewhere between the Spanish and the French. The French
criticized Moscow for its tactics, but did not challenge the Soviet
assertions. Carrillo's impression was that both the P.C.I. and the
P.C.F. had been very tranquil after the Soviet attacks. The Yugo-
slave party analyzed the situation as being one in which the C.P.S.U.
and the P.C.E. formed two opposite poles between which Communist
59Parties would eventually have to choose.
This may in fact be the case, but the general polarization has
not yet come about. The Spanish have proceeded with their Eurocommtinist
programs while the Italians and French vacillate between opposition and
co-operation in their own countries. For the Italians, the Eurocommu-
nist path has been rocky because of Christian Democratic intransigence.
The French have been distristful of their Socialist allies and their
co-operative efforts have lacked consistency. The Spanish Communists,
now at the front of the Eurocommunist movement, go their own way as a
party with 10 per cent of the vote and as the partners of Adolfo
Suarez's centrist government. Perhaps as their strength increases they
too will experience the difficulties of the Italians and French. Yet,
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a socialist transition and the development of Eurocommunism in Europe
may well take place under the tutelage of the Spanish Communists.
In the most recent years, the P.C.E. has become important enough
to develop a program which frightens the C.P.S.U. and commands the
respect of many European Communist Parties.
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CONCLUSION
The development of the Eurocommunist programs has been an
evolutionary process which has unfolded gradually over the years. The
notoriety attached to the independent policies promoted by the Italian,
French and the Spanish Communist Parties is of a more recent vintage.
This study, focusing particularly on Spain, has traced the overall de-
velopment of the desire for autonomy on the part of the three Euro-
communist Parties. It is clear the ideological shift has not taken
pl^ce at any one particular step, but has been the product of an ongoing
re-evaluation of revolutionary strategy by the concerned organizations.
The several stages of Eurocommunist growth were all marked by
certain challenges to the discipline and leadership of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union in the international Communist movement. Not
all of these challenges originated within the domain of the Eurocoramu-
nist parties, but at each turn there occurred an event which benefited
or influences their own reorientation. By the middle of this decade the
parties had defined for themselves basic themes on which to build their
own specific domestic strategies and international policies.
The rise of the Eurocommunist tendencies had been interpreted
by some as being a unified, anti-Soviet movement. It might be better
to consider it a trend which has captured the imagination of a set of
adherents. As Santiago Carrillo has stated, the Eurocommunist themes
are actually applicable to any region which exhibits the same types of
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advanced capitalism and its ensuing crises. The convergence of middle
and working classes is an important and fundamental observation upon
which the Eurocommunist strategy is based. Tlie Communist politicians
in Spain, Italy, and France feel that this convergence is an authentic
social phenomenon and that it can and must be utilized by them. As a
result, each Communist party has adjusted its own domestic policies in
order to forge a wider based coalition of progressive forces. This
stragegy is not considered an automatic guarantee of victory. It is
believed to be a more pragmatic and potentially successful method than
the past faithfulness to Soviet inspired ideological analyses.
The Eurocommunist parties have not turned away from the Soviet
Union completely. The French, Italians, and the Spanish have simply
reordered their priorities and re-established their patriotic and
nationalistic identities. While the Spanish are at present the most
radically revisionist of the Eurocommunist parties, there is nothing to
prevent a rapprochement with the Soviet party should there be a change
of methodology or leadership within that organization. For the time
being, however, each party seems content to continue in overcoming
intransigence and opposition on the part of their domestic competitors.
It is obvious to the different leaderships that this Eurocommunist road
will still be difficult and filled with confrontations. By limiting
these differences to electoral and political contests, the Eurocoinmu-
nists feel certain that they will establish democratic credibility
with the electorate and eventually become part of a triumphant political
coalition. Along the way they must be wary not to provoke internal
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violence or international intervention.
The role of the Spanish party and Santiago Carrillo has served
to illustrate the changes in dogma that have taken place within the
Eurocommunist camp. The Spanish Party has become the leading exponent
of the Eurocommunist themes by way of its historical experiences and
the ideological revisions of its G.eneral-Secretary
. it is certain that
the Spanish party has contributed to the evolution of the restructuring
of Marxist ideology in Western Europe through both philosophy and
action
.
The Spanish party was formerly a loyal servant of Soviet in-
terests. Its actions during the Spanish Civil War and after betray the
degree of subservience to the wishes of the Communist leaders in the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Like the other Eurocommunist
parties, its disaffection with the Soviets was a gradual process. This
drift away from the Soviets was a combination of domestic necessity and
irritation at Soviet methods. The P.C.E. had been badly scarred by its
experiences during the clandestine period of existence. In order to
renew itself, it became necessary to develop policies that allowed for
accomodation with non-communist political groups. If accomplishing
this meant pulling away from Soviet influence, then Carrillo was
willing to take that step. The growth of his independence from the dic-
tates of Moscow has been the yardstick by which one can measure the
establishment of a Spanish Eurocommunist approach to socialist
transition
.
Carrillo's book, Eurocommunism and the State, marked a new era
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xn Spanish communism. It defined in general terms the facets of
revolutionary conditions that are particular to Spain. it is also an
extremely important contribution to the understanding of the nature of
the Eurocommunist tendencies. This statement about Eurocommunist aims
is an exposition of the basic qualities to be found in the shifting
strategies of the Eurocommunist parties. The work has firmly estab-
lished Carrillo's credibility as a leading Eurocommunist tactician
among not only the Eurocommunists themselves
»
but the other parts of
the international communist movement. An indication of Carrillo's new
importance is the pains the Soviets have taken to discredit him. It
is obvious that they perceive him to be a threat to their initiatives.
Both the Italians and the French have openly recognized the extremity
of Carrillo's positions. While neither party is ready to move as
quickly, and as far ideologically as the Spanish have away from the
Soviets, the P.C.E. is now watched carefully for its successes or
failures
.
The Eurocommunist methods are continually being tested in the
proving-ground of European politics. Adjustments and revisions are con
stantly taking place within the context of each party's particular situ
ation. The evolution of Eurocommunism is an ongoing process that is in
need of unending attention. Having defined the role of the Spanish
Party in this process may help to provide a comparative tool in under-
standing the actions that take place under the umbrella of Eurocommu-
nism. It is clear, however, that further diligent study is necessary
to contribute even more to the knowledge of this particular subject.
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The nature of the phenomenon lends itself easily to the task of gather-
ing new viewpoints, but its spontaneity makes the compiling of these
proposals difficult. The future of Eurocommunism on the European con-
tinent and within Spain is still undecided. It will probably remain so
for quite some time, and it will be the task of political scientists to
monitor and analyze the Eurocommunist course as it further unfolds.
Although not always easy, it is bound to be interesting.
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